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This dissertation studies environmental regulation issues in the hog production industry 
as well as forces behind the reorganization of the industry during the past two decades. 
Federal and State-level environmental regulations imposed on U.S. hog production 
during the year 2003 are examined in Chapter 1. Based on the number of regulations 
passed by the Federal government and states, the 2003 regulatory index is constructed.  
The regulatory stringency index suggests that state-level regulations vary across states 
and have increased over the years. In addition, state-level regulations are more stringent 
than federal regulations.  
Chapter 2 develops an empirically implementable theoretical model which allows 
us to investigate the long-run effects of environmental regulations on the U.S. hog 
industry. Hog feeding operations (HFOs) are divided into large feeding operations 
(LHFOs) and small feeding operations (SHFOs). The impact of the presence of a large 
number of LHFOs on the entry and exit of CHFOs is also examined. Results of this study 
suggest that: Increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the output of 
SHFOs; increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the output of 
LHFOs; increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the number of 
SHFOs; SHFO output rises significantly in states that have a greater number of LHFOs; 
LHFO output rises significantly in states that have a greater number of LHFOs; the 
number of SHFOs significantly increases in states that have a greater numbers of LHFOs; 
 
regulation increases the average SHFO size; and regulation decreases the average LHFO 
size. 
Chapter 3 examines the importance of input availability, market attractiveness, 
agglomeration economies and environmental regulations on the reorganization of U.S. 
hog production for a panel of 22 U.S. hog producing states which include, Northern 
states, Southern states and Midwest states for the period 1994-2006. Results from this 
study suggest that: Hog production in a state is positively affected by hog production in a 
nearby state, confirming the presence of agglomeration economies; Environmental 
regulations and high corn price have negative effects on state-level U.S. hog production; 
High hog prices, and favorable labor cost, and land values attract hog production; and 
transportation cost has no effect on hog production. 
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Chapter 1:  Federal and State Regulation on Hog Feeding Operations  
  
1.1. Introduction 
During the late 1990s, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) came up with a plan to address pollution from 
hog feeding operations (Metcalfe, 2000). Federal legislation before 1998, gave states the 
primary responsibility in regulating hog feeding operations. Several lagoon spills in Iowa, 
North Carolina, the contamination of the city of Milwaukee’s drinking water, and the link 
between dairy operations and poor water quality in Erath County in Texas, triggered 
more federal involvement in the regulation of pollution from animal feeding operations. 
The largest volume spill in Iowa occurred in 1995 when a malfunctioning lagoon at SNB 
Farms in Webster City spilled 1.5 million gallons of manure into the South Fork of the 
Iowa River. In 1996, 586 753 fish were killed in one lagoon spill in the North Buffalo 
Creek (NRDC)1. The recent structural changes in the U.S. hog industry such as the 
increase in large farms and decrease in small farms are believed to be a result of 
regulations on pollution from hog production.  
The objective of the first chapter is to examine the Federal and State-level 
environmental regulations imposed on U.S. hog production in the year 2003. Based on 
the number of regulations passed by the Federal government and states, the 2003 
regulatory index is constructed. A summary of the Federal regulations demonstrates that 
these regulations are a minimum requirement for states since states may have passed 
more regulations than the federal government standards since 2003.  
                                                 
1
 NRDC refers to Natural Resources Defense Council. 
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In this chapter, we examine state-level regulations for the top 10 hog producing 
states. These states account for about 86% of U.S. hog production. A close examination 
of the regulations provides evidence that regulation stringency varies across states. On 
analyzing the changes in state-level regulation stringency for the years 1994, 1998, 2000 
and 2003, there is evidence that states that had more stringent regulations in one year 
changed their regulation policies the least and that states that had the least stringent 
regulations changed their regulation policies the most. State-level environmental 
regulation for the years 1994, 1998, 2000, and the current regulation shows that 
environmental stringency continued to increase over the years.  
1.2. Environmental Regulations on Hog Farms in the U.S.: A Summary of Federal 
Regulations. 
Agricultural pollution from animal feeding operations (AFOs) is a major environmental 
concern in the high hog production regions of the United States. According to 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an AFO under the federal law is defined as an 
animal feeding operation that confines and feeds animals for a total of forty-five days or 
more during any twelve-month period and such an operation must be preventing 
vegetative forage growth from surviving the normal growing season over a portion of the 
confined area. Regulations on hog farms in the U.S. have taken several forms. These 
regulations have to do with: waste management; construction and operation of hog 
facilities; location of hog farms in relation to rivers, schools, family housing among 
others; mandatory record keeping; official inspections before and after facility operation; 
and field application of manure. Metcalfe (2000) groups the waste management 
regulations into three main groups: regulations controlling the construction of the facility 
and waste management system; regulation imposing administrative and managerial 
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restrictions; and regulations controlling the location and method of field application. It is 
important to note that the foregoing regulations vary state by state.  
Most of the environmental regulations on AFOs are related to water pollution and 
are passed through the Clean Water Act (CWA). The basis of the CWA was enacted in 
1948, and was called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act became to be known as the CWA after it went through 
reorganization and expansion in 1972. The 1972 amendments to the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act gave birth to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permit program. The NDPES federal regulation has become the blue print of 
the state regulations today. The U.S. EPA coordinates with states, the regulated 
community and the public in developing and implementing the NPDES permit program 
based on the statutory requirements contained in the CWA and the regulatory 
requirements contained in the NPDES regulations. The EPA acts as the overseer of the 
NPDES permit programs as it often requires changes over time. The NPDES regulates 
the discharge of manure or processed water into rivers and other water sources. Anyone 
who wants to discharge pollutants must first obtain an NPDES permit, failure of which 
renders any discharge illegal.  
The CWA provides the statutory basis for the NPDES permit program and the 
basic structure for regulating the discharge of pollutants from point sources to waters of 
the United States.  Potential pollutants which are part of the regulations include manure, 
litter, process wastewater2 and overflows3. The 1972 CWA was mainly concerned about 
                                                 
2
 Process wastewater means spillage or overflow from AFO facilities such as watering systems, flushing 
pens, manure pits, washing of animals among others. 
3
 Overflow is the discharge of manure or process wastewater due to the inability of a storage structure to 
contain the material, see Centner (2006). 
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surface water protection. The Effluent Limitations Guidelines (ELG) and the New Source 
Performance Standards (NSPS) which were adopted in 1974 and 1976 respectively, 
constituted a two step process designed to achieve water surface protection objectives set 
in 1972. 
 The ELG dealt with design and operating criteria through industry specific water 
quality protection rules. The 1972 CWA gives the EPA authority to set effluent limits on 
an industry-wide (technology-based) basis and on a water-quality basis that ensure 
protection of the receiving water.  The NSPS focused on coming up with definitions for 
AFOs which constitute a point source. Such AFOs are known today as concentrated 
animal feeding operations (CAFOs). AFOs classified as CAFOs are regarded as point 
sources while other AFOs are not regulated under the Act’s permitting system.  
The EPA uses the three tier system to categorize CAFOs. Under this system hog 
CAFOs are defined as large, medium or small based on the number of animal units in the 
operation. The NPDES permit requirements for CAFOs are tailored for all confined 
animals and manure, litter and process wastewater generated by animals or the 
production of the animals.  The EPA distinguishes between production areas and 
application areas. Production areas for CAFOs are defined by the federal regulations to 
include animal confinement areas, manure storage areas, raw material storage areas and 
wastewater containment areas.  
In the late 1990s the EPA through a court order agreed to make revisions to the 
1972 CWA rules. New rules defining environmental regulations for CAFOs were 
released in December 2002. The new rules are referred to as the 2003 CWA Revisions 
and they took effect between July, 2007 and February, 2009, becoming the first major 
5 
 
revision of the 1972 CWA. Under the new rules, large hog producers are required to 
obtain a permit whether or not they have had any discharges in the past. The production 
area requirements for CAFOs under federal regulations apply to large hog CAFOs that 
have operations with 2500 hogs or more weighing 55 pounds or more, and 10, 000 hogs 
or more each weighing less than 55 pounds. In addition there must be no discharge of 
manure, litter or process wastewater from the production area unless certain conditions 
are met. If the discharge was caused by rainfall or if the CAFO complies with the 
inspection, monitoring, record-keeping, and mortality disposal and other provisions, such 
a discharge will be exempted from the federal regulation. In addition if the production 
area is designed, operated, and maintained to contain all of the manure, litter, and process 
waste water, including storm water plus run off from the 25-year, 24 hour rainfall event 
or a 100 year, 24 hour storm in an operation constructed after April 14, 2003, the 
discharge will be exempted under the federal regulations. 
 Under the 2003 CWA revisions, new storage structures must be designed and 
maintained to contain the run-off from a 100 year, 24 hour storm event which is more 
stringent than the 1972 CWA requirement. The CAFO regulations require an NPDES 
permit for any discharge of waste on lands under the control of a CAFO. Requirements 
under land application areas include; manure management plans, land application 
setbacks and buffer requirements, transfer of manure or wastewater off a farm, and 
maintenance of records for land application. Under the 2003 regulations, AFOs are 
required to develop and implement a Nutrient Management Plan (NMP) which must at a 
minimum include Best Management Practices (BMP). A NMP analyzes manure annually 
for nitrogen and phosphorous content. In addition, land application areas are also required 
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to be analyzed every five years for phosphorus content, to check for excess nutrient 
build-up in relation to what crops can utilize. BMPs are measures that have been found to 
be the most effective, practical means of preventing or reducing pollution from nonpoint 
sources, (Copeland, 2008). BMPs include observing setbacks from streams, vegetated 
buffers, determination of application rates to reduce the transport of nitrogen and 
phosphorus to streams and rivers, daily and weekly inspections, maintenance of depth 
markers in lagoons and on-site record keeping.  
Large CAFOs are required to implement land application setbacks4 and buffers or 
alternative conservation practices on lands in which they apply manure. The federal 
regulations prohibit large CAFOs from applying manure, litter or process water closer 
than 100 feet to any down gradient surface waters, sinkholes, agricultural wellheads and 
open tile intake structures (Henry, 2003). Alternatively, instead of the 100 foot setback, 
CAFO owners may use a 35 foot wide vegetative buffer5 where applications of manure, 
litter, or process wastewater are not allowed. For each land application site, information 
about setbacks and buffers must be included in the NMP and may be required in the 
permit application.  
As of December 2006, the EPA requires that the following minimum records 
must be maintained: 
i. Results from manure, litter, and process water and soil sampling. 
                                                 
4
 Setback: a specified distance from surface waters or potential conduits to surface waters where manure, 
litter, and process wastewater many not be land applied. 
5
 The EPA defines a vegetative buffer as a narrow, permanent strip of dense perennial vegetation 
established parallel to the contours of and perpendicular to the dominant slope of the field for the purposes 
of slowing water runoff, enhancing water infiltration, and minimizing the risk of any potential nutrients or 
pollutants from leaving the field and reaching surface waters. 
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ii. Test methods used to sample and analyze soil and manure, litter, or process 
wastewater. 
iii. Dates manure, litter or process wastewater is applied to each field. 
iv. Weather conditions at the time of application and 24 hours before and after the time 
of application. 
v. Explanation of the basis for determining manure application rates. 
vi. Calculations showing the total nitrogen and phosphorus to be applied to each field, 
including sources other than manure, litter, or process water. 
vii. Total amount of nitrogen and phosphorus actually applied to each field, including 
documentation of calculations for the total amount applied. 
viii. Methods used to apply the manure, litter, or process water. 
ix. Dates of manure application equipment inspection. 
x. Expected crop yields. 
States were required to implement the 2003 rules by February 2005. However the 
2003 rules were challenged in court and this delayed their implementation nationwide. 
While some states implemented the 2003 revisions sooner, they were not required to 
adopt them before February 2009. The 2003 CAFO rule was challenged by organizations 
from environmental and farm groups in Waterkeeper Alliance,Inc vs Environmental 
Protection Agency for containing provisions that were objectionable to environmental 
and farm groups. The objections were centered on: deficiencies in the NPDES permits; 
the absence of a review of permits by the permitting authority; and lack of public 
participation6.   
                                                 
6
 Details on the proceedings of the challenge are documented in “Clarifying NPDES Requirements for 
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations” by Centner (2006). 
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The Waterkeeper Alliance Inc challenged the NPDES permit system for incorporating 
qualitative measures such as BMPs which are non numerical. Instead the Waterkeeper 
Alliance Inc argued that NPDES permits should also require NMPs in the permit 
applications. The new 2003 rule did not require permitting authorities to review NMPs 
and meant that NMPs that do not meet the statutory effluent limitations and standards 
could be easily overlooked. The Waterkeeper Alliance Inc argued that the failure for the 
new 2003 rule to make NMPs available to the public meant that the applicable effluent 
limitations were not known by the public making it tough for them to make judgments on 
whether they are deviating from a plan’s requirement. The EPA, following the Second 
Circuit Court decision of 2005 in Waterkeeper Alliance,Inc vs Environmental Protection 
Agency, is required to update the 2003 CAFO rule to reflect the changes suggested by the 
court7. The revised 2003 rules were implemented starting from July 31, 2007 to February 
27, 20098.  
The following section provides a summary of state specific environmental regulations on 
hog farms and how they compare to the federal level regulations summarized in Section 
1.2.  A detailed description of state-specific regulations is provided in Appendix A. 
1.3. Environmental Stringency Construction: State-level Regulations versus 
Federal-level Regulations  
The summaries of Federal-level and state-level environmental regulations provided in 
Section 1.2 and Appendix A allow us to construct the current general environmental 
stringency index. The last environmental stringency index on AFOs was constructed 
through 2000 regulations by Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b). In addition we 
                                                 
7
 For further details on Waterkeeper Alliance,Inc vs Environmental Protection Agency see “EPA’s 
Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision in the CAFO Litigation.” 
8
 For more details regarding the postponement in the implementation of the 2003 rules see EPA 
Concentrated Animal feeding Operations Final Rulemaking: Date Extension, 2007. 
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construct a setback environmental stringency on AFOs.  A detailed state by state 
documentation of state level environmental regulations is provided in the previous 
section. 
The variation of state-level environmental regulation stringency on HFOs stems 
from the legislation imposed at the state-level, since some states choose to place more 
stringent restrictions on HFOs than others. Several regulations are required of all 
operations by the federal government (FED): waste management plans (WMPs), 
mandatory record keeping (MRK), odor abatement plans (OAPs), handling of dead swine 
(HDS), reports on waste spillage (RWS), nutrient management plans (NMPs), 
manure(dry and liquid) application setbacks (MAPs), cost share programs (CSPs) and 
AFO location setbacks (ALSB). In addition, all of the top 10 states enforce: facility 
design approval (FDA); and construction and operation permits (COPs). 
 However, variation in regulation exists within these ten states. For example, the 
states of NC, MN, NE, and KS have zoning requirements, while only MN and IL regulate 
hydrogen sulfide (HSR). Table 1 compares the stringency of regulations of HFOs at the 
state-level. A ‘0’ indicates that the type of regulation is not used at the state level; a ‘1’ 
indicates that the type of regulation is enforced at the state-level; and a ‘2’ indicates that 
the regulation is more stringent at the state level than the associated federal standard. 
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Table 1: 2003-2009 State and Federal Regulations on HFOs 
Source: State websites, 2=extensive regulation enforced, 1=regulation is enforced, 
0=regulation is not enforced 
 
 
The listing of environmental regulations in Table 1 allows for state-level 
regulatory stringency comparisons and ranking according to regulation stringency. To 
create a stringency index, we sum the number of regulations imposed in the state and by 
the Federal government (Metcalfe, 2000). From a comparison based on the number of 
regulations imposed, the states of NC and IL have the most stringent legislation, while 
the states of IA, MN, IN, OK, and KS have the second highest stringency index value. 
The states of NE and MO rank third and OH are the lowest on the stringency ladder 
among the top 10 hog producing states. The FED has the weakest regulations as 
compared to the top hog producing states. Evident from the regulations above (Table 1), 
individual states have tighter environmental regulations than the FED.   
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IA 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 13 
NC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 14 
MN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
IL 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 14 
NE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 12 
IN 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 13 
MO 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 12 
OK 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 13 
OH 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 12 
KS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 13 
FED 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9 
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Table 2 shows the variation of setback requirements across states and how these 
compare to the federal setback requirements. Setback requirements are divided into AFO 
location setbacks (LS), dry manure surface application setbacks (DMS), liquid manure 
surface application setbacks (LSMS) and liquid manure direct injection setbacks (LIMS). 
The federal government requires 1000 feet on LS’s. The states of MN, NE, IN, and OH 
enforce the federal location setbacks. The location setback requirements for the 
remaining states are 1875 feet, 2500 feet, 3000 feet, 4000 feet, 1mile, and 3 miles for the 
states of IA, NC, MO, IL, KS ,and  OK, respectively.   
Table 2: 2003-2009 State and Federal setback requirements for HFOs 
St
a
te
 
LS
 
D
M
S 
LS
M
S 
LI
M
S 
IA 1875 800 800 800 
NC 2500 300 300 300 
MN 1000 300 300 300 
IL 1mile 300 1 mile 1mile 
NE 1000 300 300 300 
IN 1000 500 500 500 
MO 3000 300 300 300 
OK 3miles 300 300 300 
OH 1000 300 300 300 
KS 4000 300 300 300 
FED 1000 300 300 300 
Source: State websites. The rest of the values except those denoted as miles are measured in feet  
 
The federal government does not distinguish between, dry and liquid manure, and 
surface and direct injection manure application, on its setback requirements. The federal 
setback requirement for any type of manure application is 300 feet. At the state-level, 
12 
 
only the state of IL distinguishes between dry manure setbacks, and liquid manure 
setbacks. None of the remaining nine states of the ten states considered here distinguish 
between the surface application and direct injection of liquid manure setbacks.  The states 
of IN, IA and IL enforce manure application setbacks that are more stringent to the 300 
feet requirement.  
1.4. State-level Environmental Regulations 1994, 1998, 2000 and 2003 
The environmental regulation stringency indices for the years 1994, 1998, 2000, and 
2003 environmental regulations are provided in Table 3.   
Table 3: 1994, 1998, 2000 and 2003 State-level Environmental Legislation 
State 1994 1998 2000 2003 
IL 2 8 9 14 
IN 4 6 6 13 
IA 4 9 10 13 
KS 4 9 9 13 
MN 8 9 9 13 
MO 6 7 8 12 
NE 3 7 9 12 
NC 1 8 9 14 
OH 5 7 9 12 
OK 4 6 9 13 
Source: Metcalfe (2000), Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) and author’s estimates  
The 1994 and 1998 regulation stringency indices were constructed by Metcalfe (2000).  
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) constructed the 2000 environmental 
regulations. The 2000 regulations in Table 3 are a modified version of the regulations 
reported in Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b). 
 We modified their regulation stringency index to match the methodology used by 
Metcalfe (2000) so that we can compare the regulations in 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2003.  
To update the 2000 index constructed by Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b), we 
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tracked the changes in individual regulations between 1998 and 2000 as reported in 
Metcalfe (2000) and Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b), respectively. Comparing 
the two indices, we determined if a state adopted a new regulation after 1998. If a new 
regulation was added as reflected in 2000, we added the regulation to the 1998 index to 
construct the 2000 index. In this study we construct the 2003 regulations following 
Metcalfe (2000).  The 2003 regulations differ from their 1994, 1998, and 2000 
counterparts in that they incorporate the 2003 revisions to the Clean Water Act 
regulations governing animal feeding operations which most states adopted as soon as 
they were announced. The rankings of states according to regulatory stringency for the 
years 1994, 1998, 2000 and 2003 are provided in Table 4. 
Table 4: State-level Regulation stringency ranking 
1994 
Rank 1994 states 
1998 
rank 1998 states 
2000 
rank 2000 states 
2003 
rank 2003 states 
1 MN 1 
KS, IA, 
MN 
 
 1 IA 1 IL, NC 
2 MO 4 IL, NC 2 
IL, KS, 
MN, NE, 
NC, OH, 
OK 3 
IN, IA,KS, 
MN,OK 
3 OH 6 
MO, NE, 
OH 9 MO 8 
MO, NE, 
OH 
4 
IN, IA,KS, 
OK 
 9 IN, OK 10 IN   
8 NE       
9 IL       
10 NC       
 
1.5. Summary and Conclusions. 
Examination of the regulation stringency indices for the years 1994, 1998, 2000 and 2003 
demonstrates that state-level regulation stringency increased over the years. State-level 
regulations on hog production have become more stringent since 1994. Between the years 
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1994 and 1998 the greatest increase in the number of regulations was in the states of 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, and North Carolina. The states of Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Ohio, and Oklahoma changed their regulations the least (Metcalfe, 2000). Minnesota and 
Missouri were the most stringent states in 1994 but did not implement many new polices 
between 1994 and 1998, and became less stringent than states like Iowa, and Kansas.  
Between the years 1998 and 2000, increases in the number of regulations were 
greatest in Oklahoma, Nebraska and Ohio.  The states of Ohio and Oklahoma were 
among the states that changed their regulations the least between 1994 and 1998. The 
states of Indiana, Kansas, and Minnesota did not change their regulations between 1998 
and 2000.  A close examination of regulations imposed between 2000 and 2003, shows 
that increases in the number of regulations were the greatest in Illinois, Indiana, and 
North Carolina. The states that changed their regulation policies the least between 2000 
and 2003 were Iowa, Nebraska and Ohio.  
The states of Illinois and North Carolina which had the least stringent regulations in the 
year 1994, ranked second in the years 1998 and 2000 and first in the year 2003 among the 
top 10 hog producing states.  The state with the most stringent regulations in 1994, 
Minnesota, ranked second for the years 2000 and 2003. The state of Missouri which was 
ranked second in 1994 currently has the least stringent regulations along with the states of 
Nebraska and Ohio.  
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Chapter 2: Environmental Regulation and the Structure of U.S. Hog 
Farms 
 
2.1: Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, the U.S. hog industry has been the subject of significant 
changes in operation size, organizational structure, and technological base. Associated 
with the structural changes in the industry is the rapid increase in the level of 
environmental regulations by the Federal government and individual states. The 
regulations are believed to have contributed to the changing landscape of hog production 
by speeding up the exit of small hog farms.  
 Prompting the regulations is the environmental damage associated with hog 
production. Hog production causes water pollution and deterioration of soil quality by 
contaminating water and soil with nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphate. These 
nutrients are bad for the soil when applied in excessive amounts or when manure leaks 
from waste storage lagoons. Excess nitrogen and phosphate have also been blamed for 
causing stunted growth in plants as well as causing accelerated eutrophication9 of water 
systems (Ni et al. 2002).  Hog production also affects air quality through odor, which 
occurs from the hydrogen sulfite originating from anaerobic fermentation of manure. 
High concentrations of hydrogen sulfite are toxic to human and animal life as they can 
cause dizziness, irritation of the respiratory tract, nausea, and headaches, (Ni et al., 2002; 
Sneeringer, 2010). Recently, an increase in livestock production has been found to be 
associated with an increase in infant mortality (Sneeringer, 2009). In a moist atmosphere 
                                                 
9
 Eutrophication is a process whereby water bodies receive excess nutrients (nitrogen and phosphates) that 
stimulate excessive plant growth (e.g. algae). This enhanced plant growth reduces dissolved oxygen in the 
water when dead plant material decomposes and can cause other organisms to die. 
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hydrogen sulfite can turn into sulfuric acid which can be detrimental to concrete and 
metal (Ayoub et al. 2004).  
 To address the environmental damage, the federal government requires states with 
animal feeding operations (AFOs) to enforce environmental regulations such as waste 
management plans (WMPs), mandatory record keeping (MRK), odor abatement plans 
(OAPs), handling of dead swine (HDS), reports on waste spillage (RWS), nutrient 
management plans (NMPs), manure (dry and liquid) application setbacks (MAPs), cost 
share programs (CSPs) and AFO location setbacks (ALSB). Federal involvement in 
environmental regulations on AFOs began with the inception of the Clean Water Act of 
1972.  
While federal regulations must be met nationwide, many states, facing pressure 
from environmental groups, have adopted more stringent regulations than the federal 
standards. In addition to regulations required by the federal government, some states 
require facility design approval (FDA); construction and operation permits (COPs); 
zoning requirements; and hydrogen sulfide regulations. Regulations on hog production 
vary from state to state mainly due to three reasons. First, the design of Federal water 
policy laws gives states sufficient authority and flexibility to design and implement their 
own environmental laws. States have the option to provide funding for voluntary 
programs to address the environmental needs of local areas. Second, the characteristics of 
the nonpoint-source pollution vary by state. States may use different judgments because 
linking observations of particular management practices associated with confined hog 
feeding operations to changes in water quality is problematic. Third, the characteristics of 
the states that have to deal with the pollution vary. Differences within states in farming 
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practices, land forms, climate and hydrologic characteristics may require different 
environmental laws (Sullivan, Vasavada and Smith 2000).10  
How such regulations affect AFOs prompted several economists and 
environmentalists to examine:  (1) how the increase in environmental stringency affected 
U.S. hog production; and (2) the determinants of exit behavior of U.S hog farms.  Hog 
production has consistently been found to be negatively affected by environmental 
regulation (Metcalfe 2001; Roe, Irwin and Sharp 2002; and Herath, Weersink, and 
Carpentier 2005b). Metcalfe (2001) also found that environmental stringency only 
affected small HFOs (SHFO) and had no effect on large HFOs (LHFO).  In a study 
addressing the determinants of exit behavior of small hog farms and whether large farms 
are displacing small farms in the U.S hog industry Kuo (2005) finds that technological 
improvement, unemployment rate, and hog price affect the exit behavior of small hog 
farms. The study also finds that state-level policies such as environmental regulation and 
incumbent large hog farms have no effect on the exit of small hog farms. 
As important as the foregoing studies are in providing insights on the economic 
impact of environmental regulations on the structure of the industry, none offered an 
economic framework that links the empirical findings to an explicit theory of long-run 
industry equilibrium and environmental regulations.  Our aim in this article is to develop 
such a framework.   
Specifically, we develop an empirically implementable theoretical model which 
allows us to investigate the long-run effects of environmental regulations on the U.S. hog 
                                                 
10
 A table showing the variation of environmental regulation stringency among the top ten hog producing 
states and the federal government is provided in appendix A. 
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industry.  Issues such as whether regulation favors small or large firms, increases the 
average firm-size, and reduces the number of firms are examined. In addition, we 
examine whether incumbent large farms crowd out small firms. All these issues have 
implications for the long-run equilibrium of the industry via entry and exit.  
There are several reasons why environmental regulations may not be size-neutral.  
One reason is that regulation compliance may impact entry and exit conditions through 
raising the sunk costs associated with entry, generating cost differentials between entrants 
and incumbents, or slowing down the process of entry and exit (Heyes 2009).  Heyes 
(2009) summarized the literature on the effect of regulation on competition. Studies in 
other industries have shown that regulation compliance is associated with changes in the 
scale of production and increase in average firm size (Pittman 1981; Pashigian 1984; 
Kohn 1988), and reduction in the number of establishments (Pashigian 1984).    
Another reason is potential compliance asymmetries, i.e., differences in 
compliance costs per unit of output between small and large firms. Such asymmetries are 
possible when regulations are equally applied and enforced across small and large firms 
(Pashigan 1984; Bartel and Thomas 1987). Previous studies examining this question have 
found mixed results. In some studies, environmental regulations have been found to favor 
large incumbent firms at the expense of small firms (Pitman 1981; Pashigian, 1984; 
Bartel and Thomas 1987; Kohn 1988; Heyes 2009).  Empirical findings from other 
studies (Ringleb and Wiggins 1990; Becker and Henderson 1997) did not support the 
conclusion that environmental regulations favors large firms at the expense of small 
firms.  Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) posited that larger firms in hazardous industries 
might attempt to shield assets to protect themselves from liabilities associated with 
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environmental regulations. Their findings on small firm entry from 1967-1980 suggest 
that an increase in the number of small corporations in hazardous sectors was a result of 
such divesture.  
Enforcement asymmetries which result when regulations are not equally enforced 
on small versus large firms are also important (Pashigan 1984). As with compliance 
asymmetries, enforcement assymmetries favor large versus small firms. Regulation has 
also been found to discourage the formation of small firms (Dean, Brown, and Stango 
2000).  
Results of our study suggest that: 
1. Increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the output of 
SHFOs. 
2. Increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the output of 
LHFOs. 
3. Increased state-level regulation stringency significantly lowers the number of 
SHFOs. 
4. SHFO output rises significantly in states that have a greater number of LHFOs.  
5. LHFO output rises significantly in states that have a greater number of LHFOs.  
6. The number of SHFOs significantly increases in states that have a greater 
numbers of LHFOs. 
7. Regulation increases the average SHFO size. 
8. Regulation decreases the average LHFO size. 
Results on the impact of regulation on the output of SHFOs conform to earlier 
findings in the hog industry (Metcalfe, 2001), and other industries (Pitman, 1981; 
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Pashigian, 1984; Bartel and Thomas, 1987; Kohn, 1988). The result that regulation has a 
negative impact on the number of SHFOs is consistent with the findings by earlier studies 
in other industries (Pitman, 1981; Pashigian, 1984; Bartel and Thomas, 1987; Kohn, 
1988). Recall that results by Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) and Becker and Henderson 
(1997) do not support our findings pertaining to SHFOs. The negative effect on the 
output of large operations is likely due to divesture and supports the findings by Ringleb 
and Wiggins (1990). Our results provide evidence against any crowding-out effect, where 
incumbent LHFOs force SHFOs out of the U.S. hog industry.  The result that regulation 
increases the average size of small farms is consistent with findings by Pittman (1981), 
Pashigian (1984) and Kohn (1988). The finding that regulation decreases the average size 
of large farms is consistent with Ringleb and Wiggins (1990). In a nutshell our results 
suggest that regulation compliance cost has led to the exit of small hog farms which helps 
explain the changing structure of the U.S. hog industry.  
The rest of the study will be organized as follows, Section 2.2 provides the 
background of the U.S. hog industry, Section 2.3 provides a review of relevant past 
literature, Section 2.4 provides the theoretical model and conclusions based on the 
theoretical model, Section 2.5 provides the empirical model and analysis, and Section 2.6 
provides the summary and conclusions. 
2.2. Background of the U.S Hog Industry  
According to the MINDBRANCH website, the U.S. hog and pork industry comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in raising hogs and pigs. The industry is made up of 
establishments engaged in farming activities such as breeding, farrowing, and the raising 
of weanling pigs, feeder pigs, or market size hogs. The hog and pig industry ends at the 
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point when the livestock is sold or transferred off the farm. It is important to note that the 
production and packaging of processed meats is not part of this industry. How do pigs 
and hogs differ? The name pig embraces hogs, the only difference being that a hog is a 
domesticated pig that weighs more than 120 pounds.  Hogs and pigs have cloven hooves, 
short legs and a snout used for digging. From now on, we will refer to the hog and pig 
industry as the hog industry. The U.S. hog industry consisted of about 3 million farms 
during the 1950s. According to a USDA report by Key and McBride(2007), the number 
of hog farms fell by more than 70% between 1992 and 2004 from over 240, 000 to about 
70, 000. Figure 1 shows these dynamics.  
 
Figure 1: Number of U.S Hog operations and Hog inventory 
 
 
Figure 1 above shows that hog inventory remained stable despite the drastic reduction in 
the number of hog farms. It is important to note that while the number of hog farms 
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experienced a huge decline between 1992 and 2004, the overall number of farms in the 
U.S remained stable during the same period (Key and McBride, 2007). In other words, 
the general farm numbers encompassing all the different farm practices in the U.S 
remained fairly unchanged over the years. In 2007 the U.S. hog and pig farming industry 
comprised of about 65,000 farms with combined annual revenue of $14 billion. This 
represents a reduction of about 5000 farms between 2004 and 2007. This is, however, a 
huge drop when compared to about 3 million operations in this industry during the 1950s. 
The top 10 hog producing states in 2004 are documented in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: 2004 top 10 Hog producing states 
Rank State Value ($1,000) % of Total U.S. 
1. Iowa 3,801,018 26.49% 
2. North Carolina 2,078,800 14.49% 
3. Minnesota 1,724,512 12.02% 
4. Illinois 1,027,628 7.16% 
5. Nebraska 761,953 5.31% 
6. Indiana 738,470 5.15% 
7. Missouri 623,260 4.34% 
8. Oklahoma 615,411 4.29% 
9. Ohio 402,719 2.81% 
10. Kansas 379,048 2.64% 
Source: http://www.cattlenetwork.com 
Table 5 above shows the top 10 hog producing states in the U.S. in the year 2004. 
The ranking above is based on the value of the production. It is interesting though to note 
that the states in the 2004 ranking are exactly the same states in the 2007 ranking as 
shown in Table 6. However some states swapped positions between 2004 and 2007 such 
as Nebraska, Indiana, Ohio and Kansas. In 2004 the top three hog producing states, Iowa, 
North Carolina and Minnesota accounted for about 53% of the total value of hog 
production in the U.S. In 2007 the U.S. produced 65, 909, 000 hogs. The top three hog 
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producing states accounted for about 55% of the U.S. total hog inventories in 2007. Table 
6 below summarizes the U.S. hog industry based on the top 10 producing states, 
inventories and their percentage contribution to hog industry. 
Table 6: 2007 top 10 hog producing states 
Rank State Total state inventory % of Total U.S. 
1 Iowa 18,700,000 28.37% 
2 North Carolina 10,000,000 15.17% 
3 Minnesota 7,300,000 11.08% 
4 Illinois 4,300,000 6.52% 
5 Indiana 3,500,000 5.31% 
6 Nebraska 3,200,000 4.86% 
7 Missouri 3,050,000 4.63% 
8 Oklahoma 2,330,000 3.54% 
9 Kansas 1,860,000 2.82% 
10 Ohio 1,830,000 2.78% 
Source: http://www.cattlenetwork.com 
The changes in the number of operations from 3 million in the 1950s to about 
65000 operations in 2007 may reflect a lot of structural changes in this industry over the 
years.  The changes in animal production saw an expansion in concentrated animal 
feeding operations (CAFOs), a rise in the issues associated with large numbers of animals 
in confined areas, Centner (2006). The changing structure of the U.S. hog production 
industry towards more concentrated large hog farms has created concerns over the danger 
such big animal feeding operations (AFOs) are likely to pose to the waters of the country. 
The issues associated with large confined animal feeding operations include; water 
contamination, air pollution, health effects, concern about antibiotics, animal welfare and 
loss of resources.11  The foregoing concerns are related to the production of animals and 
could be solved if environmentally friendly production and management practices are 
                                                 
11
 For a detailed discussion of these environmental issues see Centner (2006). 
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voluntarily exercised by the owners of the operations. However, Centner (2006), noted 
that this measure has failed to achieve the desired water quality and this has led to the 
need for governmental regulatory controls in order to address pollutant problems.  
2.3: Literature Review 
This section will review the relevant literature to the current study. 
2.3.1. Relevant literature on regulation and market structure  
Pittman (1981) in a study based on a study of 30 integrated paper mills in Wisconsin and 
Michigan concluded that abatement requirements increase the minimum efficient size of 
plants which in turn increase the barriers to entry.  
Kartz and Rosen (1983) analyzed the effects of taxation as a cost shifter using 
the conjectural variations model of oligopoly. The study demonstrates the way in which 
the incidence of a tax depends upon the pattern of firm interaction. The authors found an 
interesting result that a shift in the cost function (increase in cost) can lead to higher 
profits. They conclude that  the  notion that oligopolists act as they were competitive or 
monopolists is likely to provide misleading results, since it is possible for oligopolists 
that a tax can lead to higher profits, while this result never arise in competitive or 
monopolistic markets. Their result supports the heavily criticized econometric result by 
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963), which concluded that a tax can lead to higher profits 
under oligopoly. 
 Pashigan (1984) examined the effects of environmental regulation on changes in 
the number of plants in pollution-intensive industries and concluded that regulation 
reduced the number of firms per industry and raised the average plant size. This study 
also finds that regulation placed a greater burden on small plants than on large plants. 
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Bartel and Thomas (1987) documented the competitive advantages which arise 
from the asymmetrical distributions of OSHA and EPA regulatory impact among 
different types of firms.  They concluded that regulation favors large firms over small 
firms because large firms may acquire a form of relative competitive advantage over 
small firms. Their study also finds that in some cases comparative advantage obtained 
from differential regulatory costs outweighed the costs of compliance. 
Kohn (1988) examined the impact of pollution abatement costs on market 
structure based on a general equilibrium model. The study identified two effects which 
push towards larger firms and higher concentration. Firstly, the input effect which is 
based on the idea that compliance costs contribute to fixed costs and shift the U-shaped 
average cost curve to the right. This increases the scale at which average cost is 
minimized. Secondly, the output effect which occur when the percentage reduction in 
emissions due to abatement increases or decreases the level of output of the polluting 
firm.  
Litchenberg, Parker and Zilberman (1988) developed a method for estimating 
marginal costs of environmental regulations affecting agriculture, in the short-run, when 
the direct costs of environmental and resource policies vary among regions. Their results 
indicate that, redistribution of income among producers becomes the dominant effect of 
pesticide policies when supply elasticities are higher and demand elasticities are lower, 
with changes in supply elasticity having a greater impact than changes in demand 
elasticity. Results also show that for crops with significant export markets, foreign 
consumers may bear much of the cost of restrictive policies in the short run. The authors 
do infer long run results, that higher production costs will provide an incentive for entry 
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by foreign producers undermining U.S. competitiveness, without explicitly incorporating 
them in the analysis   
Bartik (1988) examined the effect of state environmental regulations on the 
location of manufacturing plants. The study separates the effect of state air pollution 
regulations from that of state water pollution regulations. The author used state spending 
on water pollution control, state spending on air pollution control, average air and water 
compliance costs in state, and particulate regulations. Results found no statistically 
significant effects of environmental regulation on business location.  
Bartik (1989) examined how the characteristics of American states affect small 
business start-ups. Among these characteristics was environmental stringency which was 
proxied by the number assigned to strictness of state environmental regulations, as of 
1983, by the Conservation Foundation.  Results show that environmental regulations 
were found to have a positive and significant effect on small businesses starts. 
Ringleb and Wiggins (1990) analyzed the application of liability to large-scale, 
long- term hazards.  They argued that larger firms in hazardous industries might attempt 
to shield assets to protect themselves from liabilities associated with environmental 
regulations. They also hypothesized that incumbents would divest themselves of 
hazardous activities. Their results on small firm entry from 1967-1980 suggest that an 
increase in the number of small corporations in hazardous sectors was a result of such 
divesture.   
Shy (1995) defines market structure as a description of the firm’s behavior in a 
given industry or market. Four notable items defining a firm’s behavior are said to 
include: (1) the actions available to each firm such as price setting, quantity setting, and 
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setting production capacity; (2) the number of firms in the industry and whether free 
entry and exit is possible or not; (3) firms’ expectations about the actions available to 
competing firms, and the response of the firms in the industry to each firm’s action; and 
(4) firms’ expectation about the number of firms and potential entry. 
Sunding (1996) developed a method of measuring the marginal welfare cost of 
environmental regulations affecting agriculture. The author extends the work  by  
Litchenberg, Parker and Zilberman(1988) by explicitly considering temporal as well as 
spatial diversity when measuring marginal welfare costs of nonuniform environmental 
regulations (i.e. pesticide application reduction requirement) affecting agriculture. The 
work facilitates the design of season and region specific environmental regulations. The 
ability of the method developed by the author can be used to measure the marginal costs 
of regulating agricultural production at a disaggregated level and can thus be paired with 
earth science data to gain a better picture of marginal costs and benefits of localized 
environmental regulation.    
Hamilton and Sunding (1997) examined the effect of changing supply on the 
market structure of the downstream food processing sector allowing for cost differences 
and endogenous downstream entry and exit. The main results indicate that increasing 
concentration in the food processing sector leads to a decrease in market power and when 
there is an outward shift in the farm supply curve, concentration can only increase when 
there is a decrease in market power.  
Becker and Henderson (1997) examined the unintended effects of air quality 
regulation on decisions of major polluters, using plant data for the years 1963 to 1992. 
They found an increase in the number of small firms in the four high polluting industries 
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they examined which included industrial organic chemicals, plastic products, metal 
containers and wood furniture.  
Dean, Brown, and Stango (2000) estimated the effects of environmental 
regulations on the formation of small manufacturing establishments across 170 
manufacturing industries for the years 1967 to 1980. Their results suggested that greater 
environmental regulations intensity is associated with fewer small business formations. 
Results also found that regulation had no effect on the formation of large establishments. 
They concluded that environmental regulations put small entrants at a unit cost 
disadvantage. 
Lahiri and Ono (2007) analyzed the effects of an increase in emission tax on a 
symmetric oligopoly. Their study allows for firms to reduce emissions using abatement 
technologies. Their results suggested that aggregate output decreases with an increase in 
emission tax while the emissions tax has an ambiguous effect on output per firm. Output 
per firm was found to increase (decrease) provided the inverse demand function is 
concave (convex).  
Heyes (2009) surveyed theoretical and empirical research on the effects of 
regulation on the vigor of competition in product markets. The study concludes that 
environmental regulations can advantage large firms over small firms, discourage entry 
directly, provide instruments with which incumbents can discourage entry strategically, 
and provide the basis of predatory behavior by incumbents.  
Millimet, Roy and Sengupta (2009) surveyed the literature on the economic 
effects of environmental regulation on several aspects of market structure including entry, 
exit, and size distribution of firms and market concentration. They found that existing 
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literature focuses on the private costs of environmental regulation incurred by firms and 
the benefits of environmental quality enjoyed by society, and missing in the literature is 
the potential for firms to benefit from environmental regulation through an increase in 
product demand by “green” consumers. 
2.3.2. Environmental regulations and stringency literature in the hog industry. 
Hubbell and Welsh (1998) investigated geographic concentration in the hog industry, 
using a measure based on Theil’s entropy index for the top 20 hog producing states for 
the period 1974-1996. Results showed that hog production is becoming more 
geographically concentrated at the national level and within states. The study also found 
that changes in the hog industry have led to a non-uniform interregional distribution of 
hogs.   
Fleming, Babcock, and Wang (1998) investigated the cost of delivering manure 
nutrients from Iowa swine production for two forms of manure storage (anaerobic lagoon 
and slurry basin), two target nutrients (nitrogen and phosphate), two crop rotations and 
two levels of field incorporation (tillage of manure into soil). The study addressed three 
major questions concerning swine manure management: (1) Should manure nutrients be 
conserved and applied to crops? (2) What is the impact of a policy requiring all manure 
applications to be incorporated? (3) What is the impact of a policy requiring manure 
applications to be based on phosphate? The results of the study suggest that (1) manure 
nutrient returns are maximized where high nutrient using crops are grown close to a 
medium sized swine facility that uses nutrient conserving methods to store manure (2) 
incorporating manure increases production returns while improving air quality and (3)  
basing manure applications on phosphate levels rather than nitrogen increases the value 
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of manure nutrients as applied nutrients tend to match crop requirements, the profit 
maximizing number of hogs and profits are greater under a phosphate standard than 
under a nitrogen standard. While the costs under a phosphate standard are higher, the net 
value of manure for low hog numbers (a characteristic of Iowa) is enhanced by a 
adoption of a phosphate standard. 
Fleming (1999) estimated how much larger the setback length for surface 
application of manure must be relative to the setback length for soil incorporation to 
encourage incorporation in Kentucky. Results suggested that setback lengths do not 
encourage odor control through incorporation and that the setback length for surface 
application has to be substantially longer than that of incorporation. 
Sullivan, Vasavada and Smith (2000), identified three possible reasons for the 
variation in states’ policies regulating nonpoint-source pollution. These include the 
design of Federal water policy laws, characteristics of the nonpoint-source pollution, and 
characteristics of the states that have to deal with water quality issues.  
Metcalfe (2000) examined the change in state legislation imposed to regulate 
manure management and to protect water quality between 1994 and 1998. The study also 
provides a discussion of the state legislation used to regulate animal manure management 
and how the regulation varies across states. Based on the state to state variation of the 
regulation, the study constructs a stringency index which is dependent on the number of 
legislations imposed in each state. Examination of state legislation between the two years 
showed that the stringency of state manure management regulation significantly 
increased between 1994 and 1998. The study noted that a majority of the increases in 
regulation were imposed in response to the expansion of hog production. 
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Metcalfe (2001) investigated the influence of water quality regulatory stringency 
on hog production in the U.S.  The author used a profit maximization model for hog 
production in which the environment was included as an input in the production process. 
The cost of this environmental input incurred by hog operations through utilization of 
state water was the main concern of the study. The amount of state spending on water 
quality12 and a qualitative stringency measure constructed through examination of state 
manure management regulations imposed on AFOs for the years 1994 and 1998. The 
following stringency rating, 1(low), 2(average), and 3(high), was used for each state. 
Results show that there are significant environmental compliance costs for small hog 
feeding operations. Large operations did not appear to be influenced by the level of state 
environmental stringency. 
Roe, Irwin and Sharpe (2002) addressed the factors behind the reorganization of 
the hog production in a cross-section of counties for the years 1992 and 1997. They 
concluded that the presence of other swine has a positive effect on the inventory of hogs 
in a particular county for the year, 1997, and hog production in one county was 
negatively correlated with hog production in a nearby county between 1992 and 1997. 
Regulation had a negative effect on the location of hog farms. 
Centner and Mullen (2002) analyzed enforcement mechanisms and 
opportunities for greater enforcement of AFO regulations and found that reductions in 
pollution could be a result of more effective enforcement of the existing regulations, and 
not from coming up with more regulations. The author’s recommendation to regulators is 
to revise existing regulations by moving them toward more meaningful provisions that 
                                                 
12
 Spending on water quality is defined as the amount of state monies used for managing water quality 
programs and for enforcement of water quality regulations. 
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give greater deference to efficiency criteria and to increase resources into enforcement 
efforts.  The work warns regulators that increasing the number of regulations may serve 
only to amplify benefits from noncompliance.   
Agapoff and Cattaneo (2003) addressed the effectiveness of EQIP in helping 
farmers meet nitrogen and phosphorous based manure application standards. They found 
that EQIP helps cover the costs of most of the small farmers and some of the large 
farmers. The authors found the willingness of crop operators to accept manure on their 
farms as a nutrient source to be a very important factor affecting the cost of large farms 
meeting a nutrient standard. The higher the willingness to accept manure (WTAM), the 
higher the number of large farms that will be able to meet the N-standard without 
increasing production costs, while the number of EQIP will also drop significantly. A 
high WTAM was found to have very little effect on small farms and to decrease EQIP 
funding thus making available funds for other conservation issues and making funds 
available for a large number of producers. 
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005a) described the patterns of regional 
and national change in the geographical concentration of hog, dairy, and fed-cattle 
inventories for 48 states in the United States from 1975 to 2000. The authors examined 
the association of such patterns with the changes in slaughtering/processing capacity, 
population density, and stringency in environmental regulations. Entropy measures were 
used to compare concentration nationally as well as within and across the eight major 
production regions. Results show evidence of all three sectors becoming more 
geographically concentrated within states across the country. Findings also show that hog 
and dairy inventories increased in nontraditional production regions while fed-cattle 
33 
 
inventories increased only in three major producing states. The northwestern region of 
the U.S. experienced reduced geographical concentration of livestock production while 
the western regions experienced both increased livestock production and increased 
geographical concentration. 
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) examined the factors affecting state 
annual share of national inventory for each of the hog, dairy, and fed-cattle sectors using 
data from the 48 contiguous states for 1976 to 2000. The study uses a state specific time 
series measure of stringency. A Gini coefficient ranging from 0 (equal distribution of 
livestock inventories among the states) to 1 (concentration of livestock inventories in one 
state) was used to measure the degree of geographical concentration. The Gini coefficient 
for hogs increased from 0.72 in 1975 to 0.77 in 2000 indicating increasing geographical 
concentration in this industry. Their findings also indicated that differences in 
environmental stringency facing livestock producers had a significant influence on 
production decisions in the dairy and mainly the hog sector.   
Kuo (2005) addressed the determinants of the exit behavior of small hog farms 
and whether large farms are displacing small farms in the U.S hog industry.  The study 
finds that technological improvement, unemployment rate, and hog price affect the exit 
behavior of small hog farms. The study also finds that state-level policies such as 
environmental regulation and incumbent large hog farms have no effect on the exit of 
small hog farms. 
Weersink and Raymond (2006) investigated the regional characteristics where 
spills occur, whether the spills are generating complaints, the types of citizens who are 
complaining, and whether environmental policy deters either spills or complaints. Results 
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indicated that the distance between livestock producers and both environmentally 
sensitive areas and people serves to reduce conflicts between farmers and the local 
community. Findings also suggest a positive relationship between spills in a region and 
the number of complaints with an implication that complaints can be used by regulators 
as a tool to identify problem areas. 
2.3.3. Environmental regulations and stringency literature in other livestock 
industries. 
Huang, Magleby and Christensen (2005) examined the economic impacts of the EPA’s 
manure application regulations on medium and large dairy farms in the U.S. southwestern 
region. The authors found that new EPA restrictions on land application of manure by 
CAFOs could harm the net returns of medium and large dairy farms with lagoon systems 
in the southwestern region of the country, and that higher net incomes by other types of 
dairy farms can only be achieved under these restrictions if they are able to reduce feed 
costs by better utilizing manure and expanding homegrown feed production. 
Schuk and Birchall (2001) developed a manure BMP adoption model to examine 
whether or not state level manure management regulations influence manure BMP 
adoption rates among beef CAFOs in South Dakota. The CAFO size was measured by 
herd size and acreage and regional nutrient demand was measured by regional crop 
production. The study found relatively small influences of regional crop coverage and 
state level regulations on the manure handling practices by CAFOs, while herd size is 
found to play a larger role in promoting the adoption of manure storage BMPs. 
Osei and Lakshminarayan (1996), investigated the factors previously thought to 
affect the location of dairy farms as well as the environmental policy effects on dairy 
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farm location. Results indicated environmental determinants tend to deter the location of 
dairy farms. Investigation of the influence of environmental stringency was a key factor 
in this analysis. Environmental stringency is based on four state level indicators namely 
air quality, ground water quality, soil conservation and an aggregate environmental 
policy stringency index.  The measures were obtained from data provided by the Fund for 
Renewable Energy and the Environment (FREE). The data rates states according to their 
commitment to environmental protection. 
Murat (2004) generated an environmental index for each state using the 1998 
National Survey of Animal Confinement Policies. The survey gathered information on 48 
states in the U.S. on their policies and implementation of environmental regulations of 
the livestock industry. The environmental stringency proxy is generated as an unweighted 
sum of the affirmative responses to twenty-nine regulatory stringency survey questions. 
The index the author used varies from 1(lowest environmental stringency) to 21(highest 
environmental stringency).  
Lester and Lombard (1990) provided both a review and a critique of 
environmental policy literature that existed prior to the 1990s. They developed an 
intergovernmental framework which they suggest to be a better way for studying state 
environmental policy implementation during the 1990s.   
While the foregoing studies are important in providing insights on the economic 
impact of environmental regulations on the hog industry, none addressed the effect of 
regulation on the long-run equilibrium of the industry.  The long-run impact of 
environmental regulations on the entry and exit of U.S. hog farms remains theoretically 
and empirically unanswered. Understanding the impact of regulations on the distribution 
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of hog production is an important question for policymakers. If environmental regulation 
affects the distribution across farms, it must be due to differential cost structures of large 
and small hog farms.13 In this study, we answer the following question: What is the effect 
of environmental regulations on the long-run equilibrium of the U.S hog industry 
allowing for the entry and exit of hog farms?  
Specifically, this study seeks to investigate the implications of state-level 
environmental regulations on the entry and exit of small hog farms in the U.S hog 
industry. To address this question we develop a theoretical model that addresses supply 
shifts due to the increase in environmental regulation compliance costs in a perfectly 
competitive hog industry in the long-run.  
2.4: Theoretical framework 
We present a general profit maximization model for a perfectly competitive industry with 
heterogeneous firms which will be used to analyze the impact of environmental 
regulations on HFOs in the long-run. Prior studies assumed that the hog industry is 
perfectly competitive industry (Metcalfe, 2001; Roe, Irwin and Sharp, 2002; Kuo, 2005). 
The model is an adaptation of the framework developed by Hamilton (1999), which 
addressed demand shifts in an oligopolistic industry.  
2.4.1. Model of an Industry with Heterogeneous Firm Size 
We assume a perfectly competitive industry consisting of N hog farms of two distinct 
sizes, ls nnN += , with 0>sn and 0>ln  representing the number of SHFOs and 
LHFOs , respectively. We further assume that hog farms in each HFO size category are 
                                                 
13
 Indeed the link between environmental and industry structure is the basis for  some suggestions to use 
environmental regulation to influence industry structure after  Initiative 300, the Nebraska Anti-Corporate 
Law, has been invalidated by the  courts.    
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identical, that is they have the same cost structure and are all of the same size. Costs of 
production for a single HFO of size k , for lsk ,= , are given by ),( Eqcc kkk = , where kq  
is the level of hog output for a HFO of size k  , and, E  represents environmental 
regulations imposed on HFOs. We introduce E  as a cost shifter in the same manner as in 
Katz and Rosen (1983), Litchenberg, Parker and Zilberman (1988), and Sunding (1996). 
We model the effect of regulation on the firm and industry, assuming the industry is in 
the long-run equilibrium to begin with.  
The properties of the cost functions are: 
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E , the cost function is a non-decreasing function of the levels 
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E k , the marginal cost of a HFO of size k  is a non-
decreasing function of the levels of environmental regulations.  
We assume that a representative LHFO is (weakly) more efficient than a 
representative SHFO (Rhodes 1995; Kuo 2005) due to economies of scale, and that the 
following condition holds:  
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Condition (1) states that, when evaluated at the same output level, the marginal cost of a 
SHFO is at least as much as the marginal cost of a LHFO. Specifically, the marginal cost 
for a SHFO equals that of a LHFO only at the point where profits are maximized and the 
marginal cost for a representative SHFO is greater than that of a representative LHFO 
everywhere else. The efficiency assumption implies that the marginal cost function for a 
representative LHFO is more elastic than that of a representative SHFO. Empirically this 
condition was found to be true by Rhodes (1995). Characteristics of efficient producers 
such as quick access and adoption of new technology; easy access to market information 
and ease of its use, increased specialization, and easy or superior access to all inputs 
including capital are less likely to be associated with small producers (Rhodes 1995). 
Fulton and Gillespie (1995) also argue that technological progress in the swine industry 
has lowered the cost of production for large farms.  
In order to maintain the identity of low cost LHFOs and high cost SHFOs for a 
marginal expansion in output we impose the following condition:  
(2)     lsls qql
ll
qqs
ss
q
Eqc
q
Eqc
== ∂
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),(
2
2
2
2
.  
14
  
Condition (2) states that the marginal expansion of output does not increase the marginal 
cost function of LHFOs by more than that of SHFOs. This follows from the argument 
that larger operations are more efficient than small operations. The inverse derived 
demand function facing the hog production industry is given by )(Qpp = , 
where llss qnqnQ += , is the total hog output produced by the hog production industry 
                                                 
14
 This condition eliminates the ambiguity in the definition of low cost firms by ruling out situations in 
which high and low cost firms switch identity in response to small changes in output, Hamilton (1999). 
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and p  is the hog price.  The demand curve is downward sloping, 0<
∂
∂
Q
p
. The 
representative HFO of size k ’s objective is: 
(3)     ),(max Eqcpq kkkk
qk
−=pi  
Differentiating equation (3) with respect to kq  and setting equal to zero yields the first-
order conditions for a SHFO and a LHFO, 
(4)     ),( Eqcp ss
q s
= , and 
(5)                               ),( Eqcp ll
q l
= , respectively.  
The sufficient second order condition of an HFO of size k  is, 
(6)       0<− k
qq kk
c .  
In the long-run, short-run profits or losses will induce HFOs to enter or exit the 
industry until profits are driven to zero. In this study, we treat the number of LHFOs as 
constant, so that only the number of SHFOs is determined in equilibrium. There is 
evidence that LHFOs have not been exiting the hog industry and that it takes a long time 
for a new large HFO to enter or exit the industry (Gillespie and Fulton 2001; McBride 
and Key 2003).15 In contrast, there is evidence that SHFOs have been frequently entering 
and exiting the hog industry (McBride and Key, 2003).16 Deriving the long-run 
equilibrium by allowing both SHFOs and LHFOs to enter and exit the industry in the 
long-run is not technically feasible as the coefficient matrix would be singular and not 
invertible. Among the reasons why the coefficient matrix is not invertible is that the two 
                                                 
15
 It takes a long-time to come up with a highly mechanized farm; (2) when such a large mechanized farm 
enters the industry, evidence from industry does support the fact that such farms rarely exit the industry. 
16
 Entry by small scale firms has been argued to be more common than the entry of large firms in most 
industries, Geroski (1995). 
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HFO sizes both face the same price in equilibrium and it is not possible to solve for a 
single price that satisfies the two different long-run equilibria, one for LHFOs and the 
other for SHFOs. That is, we cannot have a single price satisfying two different minimum 
points of two average cost curves relating to the two different HFO sizes. For these 
reasons, in our model we assume that only SHFOs enter and exit the industry. 
SHFOs enter until profit is driven to zero and the long-run equilibrium for the 
number of SHFOs, *sn  is determined by:  
(7)     0),( *** =−= Eqcpq sssspi or ),( ** Eqcpq sss = , 
 where *sq is the optimal output for small HFOs.  
The equilibrium number of SHFOs is determined simultaneously by the optimal output 
for each HFO in Equations (4) and (5), and the entry condition in Equation (7). 
2.4.2. Measuring the Effects of Increased Environmental Regulation 
The comparative statics effects of an environmental regulation cost shift are calculated by 
totally differentiating the first-order conditions in (4) and (5), and the entry condition (7). 
The resulting equations are combined and presented in matrix form as 
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where s
q
ss
smcpn −= 'θ , lq
ll
lmcpn −= 'θ , and the other elements are as defined earlier. 
Calculating the determinant of the coefficient matrix, Ω , and using the definitions of 
sθ and lθ , we have:  
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s
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which is negative since 0'<p ,   0>sq , 0>l
q l
mc ,and 0>s
q s
mc .              
The effects of environmental regulations on the hog output of a representative 
SHFO, output of a representative LHFO, and the number of SHFOs are: 
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The signs of the denominators in Equations (10) and (11) are positive while the 
denominator in (12) is negative by (9). The signs of (10) - (12) are all ambiguous. The 
result in (10) is positive and negative when sEssE mcqc >  and sEsEs cmcq > , respectively. 
The result in (11) is positive and negative when lEssE mcqc >  and sElEs cmcq > , 
respectively. The sign of (12) is negative when sElEs cmcq > , sEsEs cmcq > and the absolute 
value of the first two expressions in the numerator, 
)(')(' sEsEslqssElEssqs cmcqmcpncmcqmcpn ls −+− is greater than the value of the last term 
in the numerator, sE
s
q
l
q
cmcmc sl . The result in (12) is positive when lEssE mcqc > , 
and sEssE mcqc > .
17
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 Notice that the conditions under which (12) is positive and negative documented here are not exhaustive, 
that is we can have situations where  lE
ss
E mcqc > , and
s
E
s
E
s cmcq > ; and sE
l
E
s cmcq > , 
and sE
ss
E mcqc > which will change the signing suggested here. However, this does not change the 
intuition behind the ambiguity of (12). 
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2.4.1. Discussion of Results from the Economic Model 
Central to the ambiguous effects of regulation in (10)-(12) include the cost of regulation, 
its size bias, its input biases, and whether the underlying pre-and post-regulation 
technology is homothetic or non-homothetic. The effects of a regulation induced cost 
shift are the opposite of a technological change induced cost shift on the long-run 
equilibrium of a perfectly competitive industry, a question addressed in Perrin (1997).18 
For simplicity, we define the cost of regulation as the upward shift in marginal or average 
cost due to regulation. The regulation input bias affects the magnitude of the cost of 
regulation.  Regulation input bias will result when there are shifts in the optimal input 
shares used in hog production due to regulation.  
Because the cost of regulation could be a result of a shift in average cost or both 
marginal-and average cost, we cannot rule out the possibility of the farm-size (size) bias 
of regulation. Farm-size bias results when the shift in the marginal cost curve is different 
from the shift in the average cost curve at the original output-level. This is analogous to 
the firm-size bias in technology induced cost shifts. In the context of our study, a positive 
(negative) farm-size bias results when the shift in the average cost curve is greater 
(lower) than the shift in the marginal cost curve. A positive (negative) size bias implies 
that regulation will increase (decrease) the size of a representative HFO. Positive farm-
size bias results if the regulation causes a representative HFO to acquire additional capital 
to conform to regulation, leading to an increase in its scale of production. On the other 
hand, a negative farm-size bias results if a representative HFO phases out some hog 
production practices by getting rid of equipment, reducing its scale of production. The 
                                                 
18
 Perrin (1997) approximated the nature of technological change in terms of the rate of technological 
change, the size of technological change, and the input bias of technological change. 
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absence of farm-size bias results when the marginal-and average cost curves shift by the 
same magnitude.  
The signs of (10)-(12) primarily depend on how the change in the marginal costs 
of output for LHFOs and SHFOs ( kkqmc ) compare to the SHFO marginal cost of 
regulation ( sEc ). The changes in SHFO and LHFO marginal costs are scaled by the SHFO 
output (i.e. kEsmcq ).19  Equation (10) measures the change in output from an individual 
small farm after a change in environmental regulation stringency. The difference between 
the SHFO cost of regulation and the change in output-scaled SHFO marginal cost in (10) 
amounts to a difference between the shifts in the marginal-and average cost curves due to 
regulation. Because the cost of regulation reflects shifts in both marginal and average cost 
curves, the difference between the marginal cost curve shift reflected in the cost of 
regulation and the output-scaled shift in marginal cost, gives the net or overall shift in 
SHFO marginal cost. The sign of (10) is positive (negative) with positive (negative) 
regulation farm-size bias.   
Equation (11) measures the change in output by a single large firm after a change 
in the stringency of environmental regulations. The sign of (11) depends on how the shift 
in the output scaled LHFO marginal cost curve due to regulation compares to the SHFO 
cost of regulation. When the SHFO cost of regulation is greater (lower) than the output 
scaled change in LHFO marginal cost due to regulation, the result in (11) is positive 
(negative). Intuitively, since in equilibrium the marginal costs of SHFOs and LHFOs are 
the same, the direction of change is depends on whether there is positive or negative size 
                                                 
19
 We refer to kE
k mcq as the output scaled change in marginal cost due to regulation. 
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bias do play an important role. In addition to size bias, input bias of regulation also plays 
an important role. 
Equation (12) determines the effect of environmental regulation on the number of 
small firms in the industry. The result in (12) incorporates the conditions required in the 
signing of both (10) and (11).20 When positive (negative) profits arise in the adjustment 
process from the initial equilibrium to the final equilibrium, profits attract (deter) the 
entry of new HFOs, which has implications on both the equilibrium number of HFOs and 
the equilibrium output.   
  The nature of the HFO’s cost function (technology) is important in determining 
the signs of (10)-(12). Our study does not separate the contributions of the nature of 
regulation from the nature of technology in (10)-(12). The manner in which the total cost 
function is affected by regulation depends on whether the underlying technology 
associated with the cost function before and after the regulation induced shift is 
homothetic or non-homothetic. With homothetic technology, the pre-regulation cost 
function for a representative HFO of size k  takes the form, 
),1()(),( 000 EcqEqC kkkk ξ= , where )(0 kqξ is some increasing function of output (Fare 
and Mitchell, 1992). If the post-regulation technology is also homothetic the cost function 
for a representative HFO of size k  is given by ),1()(),( 111 EcqEqC kkkk ξ= . If the pre-
and post-regulation homotheticity components are equal, )()( 10 kk qq ξξ = , regulation 
shifts the total cost curve without changing its slope at every output level. This effect is 
independent of whether the pre-and post-regulation unit costs ),1(0 Ec k  and ),1(1 Ec k are 
equal or not. In this case, the marginal cost curve does not shift but the average increases 
                                                 
20
 Signing (12) combines the conditions required in signing (10) and (11). 
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at every point. This is illustrated in Figure 2 where we observe a shift only in the average 
cost curve and a movement along the original marginal cost curve due to environmental 
regulation. Since, in Figure 2, we have positive shift in the average cost curve and no 
shift in the marginal cost curve, the cost of regulation is explained by the shift in average 
cost and we observe a positive farm-size bias. 
The result in Figure 2 assumes a constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) production 
function. Binger and Hoffman (1998), show that a perfectly competitive long-run 
equilibrium is only possible for a CRS production function or a U-shaped long-run 
average cost production function. Assuming a CRS or a U-shaped long-run average cost 
production function is sufficient for the existence of the long-run competitive 
equilibrium.21 With a CRS production function, in Figure 2, regulation causes the average 
cost curve to shift from AC to AC1. The marginal cost curve does not shift since the 
slope of the total cost curve did not change at every point. The resulting effect is to 
increase both the long-run equilibrium output for an individual HFO and the long-run 
equilibrium price faced by the individual HFO from q to q1 and p to p1, respectively. The 
cost of regulation is approximated as the vertical distance between the minimum point of 
the pre-regulation average cost curve, AC, and the minimum point of the new average 
cost curve, AC1. The regulation input bias is intertwined in the cost of regulation as 
alluded to earlier. Since the average cost curve has shifted by more than the marginal cost 
curve, we observe a positive size bias in this case.  
 
                                                 
21
 Binger and Hoffman (1998), p.324-328, provide the justification on why a perfectly competitive long-run 
equilibrium exists with CRS production function and a U-shaped long-run average cost production 
functions. They also show why the long-run competitive equilibrium is non-existent with increasing-and 
decreasing returns to scale production functions.  
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Figure 2: Regulation shifts the cost function without changing its slope 
 
On the other hand, with non-homothetic technology, regulation will shift the total 
cost curve at the same time altering its slope at every point. Because regulation will have 
an effect on both marginal and average cost curves, there is a possibility for positive 
farm-size bias, negative farm-size bias increases or no farm-size bias.  As explained 
earlier, when regulation shifts marginal and average cost curves, it is not readily apparent 
whether it shifts the marginal cost curve more or less than the average cost curve. Figure 
3 illustrates the case where the regulation induced shift in the average cost curve is equal 
to the shift in the marginal cost curve.  
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Figure 2: Marginal cost shift equals average cost shift 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the case where the regulation induced shift in the average cost 
curve is greater than the shift in the marginal cost curve. Recall that the effect of 
regulation on an HFO is the direct opposite of the effect of neutral technological change 
on the firm. The most commonly documented perfectly competitive long-run equilibrium 
supply shift in economics textbooks is the technological change induced shift.22 
Regulation causes marginal-and average cost curves to shift from MC to MC3 and AC to 
AC3, respectively. The resulting effect would be to increase the long-run equilibrium 
output of an individual HFO from q to q3, implying positive farm-size bias, and to 
increase the long-run equilibrium price faced by the individual HFO from p to p3. This 
result implies that regulation has a positive effect on an individual HFO’s output.  
                                                 
22
 In the case of new technology adoption both marginal-and average cost curves shift down leading to 
reduction in price and an increase in output. 
48 
 
Figure 3: Average cost shifts more than the Marginal cost 
 
On the other hand, when marginal cost shifts upward more than average cost, 
output decreases from q to q4. Under this case, regulation will decrease HFO size. This 
case is shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 4: Marginal cost shifts more than the Average cost 
 
2.4.4. Impact of Environmental Regulation on Industry Output and Price 
In order to determine the effect of environmental regulations on the industry output, we 
differentiate the equilibrium industry output condition, **** llss qnqnQ += ,  with respect 
to E , as follows: 
s s l
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environmental regulations on the U.S hog industry is given by 
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Totally differentiating the inverse demand function, )(Qpp = , with respect to E  and 
utilizing (13) gives the change in equilibrium price due to environmental regulations 
shown in (14) below  
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Equations (13) and (14) show that an increase in environmental regulation has the effect 
of decreasing hog industry output and increasing hog industry price in the long-run. This 
result is shown graphically in Figure 6. Regulation affects the hog industry long-run price 
and output through its effects on SHFOs.23 The introduction of regulation shifts the 
marginal-and average cost curves from MC and AC to MC5 and AC5, respectively. At 
the market-level hog price increases from p to p5 and hog output falls from Q to Q5.  
Figure 5: Effect of regulation on the hog industry equilibrium 
 
Our theoretical framework finds that output for a representative HFO and the 
number of SHFOs can either increase or decrease with environmental regulation 
depending on the associated shifts in the marginal and average cost curves. Results also 
suggest that in the long-run, regulation causes hog price and hog output to increase and 
                                                 
23
 Recall that in this study we only have a long-run condition for SHFOs. 
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decrease, respectively. These results confirm the findings by Lahiri and Ono (2007) based 
on a symmetric oligopoly that an emissions tax leads to a decrease in aggregate output 
but has an ambiguous effect on output per firm. The decrease in industry output is 
consistent with negative regulation farm-size bias for both HFO sizes associated with a 
decrease in the number of SHFOs with regulation. On the other hand, in the presence of 
positive regulation farm-size bias, this is consistent with the number of SHFOs declining 
significantly with regulation.   
2.4.5. Impact of LHFOs on Industry Equilibrium 
Given that the number of LHFOs is treated as exogenous and fixed in our model, we can 
examine how the number of LHFOs affects the hog industry long-run equilibrium.  This 
allows us to be able to determine whether any crowding-out effect exists in the hog 
industry (i.e. whether the presence of a large of number of incumbent LHFOs has a 
negative effect on the entry and exit of SHFOs) or not. In other words we would like to 
know if the presence of a large  number of LHFOs has the effect of forcing SHFOs out of 
the hog industry or not. To examine the effect of ln on sq , lq and sn , we totally 
differentiate (4), (5) and (7) with respect to ln . Presenting the resulting expressions in 
matrix form we have: 
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q
l
q
s
sl mcmcqp .  
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The effect of the number of LHFOs on the output of SHFOs and LHFOs is given 
by 
(16)    0)1(' p
s
q
s
sl
l
s
smcq
qqp
n
q −
=
∂
∂
, and  
(17)    0)1(' pl
q
s
sl
l
l
lmcq
qqp
n
q −
=
∂
∂
 , respectively. 
The results in (16) and (17) suggest that the presence of a large number of LHFOs has a 
negative effect on the output of SHFOs and LHFOs. This is because when LHFOs gain 
more market share, given that demand for hogs stays the same, we expect the industry 
equilibrium to adjust so that SHFOs will produce lower output in the long run.  
The effect of the number of LHFOs on the number of SHFOs is given by 
(18)   
s
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The sign of (18) is ambiguous.  The first expression in the numerator of (18) is positive 
by sq<1 and 'p ; and the second term in the numerator is negative. The sign in (18) is 
positive (negative) if the value of the first term, ))(1(' l
q
ss
q
lsl
ls mcnmcnqqp +− , in the 
numerator is greater (lower) than the value of the second term, l
q
s
q
l
ls mcmcqp' .  This result 
suggests that the presence of a large number of LHFOs can either attract or deter the 
entry of SHFOs in equilibrium.  
The construction and implementation of the empirical model which addresses the long-
run implications of environmental regulations in the U.S hog industry as well as checking 
whether or not crowding-out effect exists in this industry is presented next. 
 
53 
 
2.5. Empirical Model and Analysis 
To develop the empirical model and test the results in (10)-(12), we focus on the long-run 
equilibrium outcomes from the first-order conditions in (4) and (5) and the long-run 
condition in (7). 
2.5.1. Empirical Model Development 
We assume that a representative HFO uses only three inputs: corn, labor and 
transportation, so that the cost function faced by a representative firm of size k , , for 
lsk ,= , is as follows: 
(19)    ),,,,( * Envirtranslaborfeedqcc kkk = ,  
where feed , labor , and trans , refer to price of corn, price of labor and price of 
transportation services, respectively. Input markets are competitive and both SHFOs and 
LHFOs face the same input prices. Envir  refers to the environmental stringency variable.   
Due to the lack of farm level data and the assumption that hog farms in each HFO 
size category are homogenous we investigate the problem by aggregating firms within 
each HFO size group. After incorporating the industry demand function we rewrite (4), 
(5) and (7) as a system of three equations and aggregating firms within each HFO size 
group, we have: 
(20)    ),,,,()( * EnvirtranslaborfeedQmcQp ss=  
(21)    ),,,,()( * EnvirtranslaborfeedQmcQp ll=  
(22)    ),,,,()( * EnvirtranslaborfeedQacQp ss= , where 
sac refers to the SHFO average cost. 
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We can simultaneously solve the system of equations (20)-(22) to determine *sN , *sQ , 
and *lQ . Since the number of LHFOs is given, it enters as an exogenous variable in 
equilibrium. Rearranging the system in (20)-(22), the equilibrium solution in implicit 
form is given by:   
(23)    * ( , , , , , )sQ f p feed labor trans Nlarge Envir=   
(24)    * ( , , , , , )lQ f p feed labor trans Nlarge Envir=  
(25)    * ( , , , , , )sN f p feed labor trans Nlarge Envir=  
Equations (23) and (24) represent the long-run supply functions for small and 
LHFOs, respectively. Equation (25) shows the factors affecting the number of SHFOs in 
equilibrium. It is important to know that price is endogenous in equilibrium as it gives us 
information about the demand function. That is, the long-run equilibrium is defined by 
the intersection between the long-run supply function and the demand curve. In our 
model, we assume that the environmental regulation cost shifter does not have any effect 
on the demand schedule, so any change in equilibrium involves shifts in the supply curve 
and a movement along the demand curve. The econometric model which is based on our 
theoretical model is presented below.  
2.5.2 .Econometric Model for Estimation 
In addition to the information derived from the theory in (23)-(25), in our estimation we 
include dummy variables to capture the effects of different time periods and state-level 
characteristics. The econometric model to be estimated is given below: 
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(26) kttkktktktktktkt
s
kt TKEnvireNltranslaborfeedpQ 16543210 arg εβββββββββ +++++++++=
  
(27) kttkktktktktktkt
l
kt TKEnvireNltranslaborfeedpQ µγγγγγγγγγ +++++++++= 6543210 arg
 
(28) kttkktktktktktktkt TKEnvireNltranslaborfeedpNsmall υθθθθθθθθθ +++++++++= 6543210 arg  
Where k = state, t = year (1994-2006). The s'β , s'γ , and s'θ are parameters to be 
estimated while, ε , µ , andυ , represent the error terms. The variable K  is a dummy 
variable representing state-level unobserved characteristics and the variable T  is a 
dummy variable representing the effects of different time periods. We allow for 
unobserved effects as they may have effects on the coefficients of the continuous 
variables in the model. If they do have statistically significant effects, there is no reason 
to ignore them. 
Hog price and environmental regulations compliance costs (Envir) are 
endogenous in the system of equations (26)-(28). The endogeneity of environmental 
compliance costs was first noted by Metcalfe (2001) and later adopted by Herath, 
Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b). We use price of beef, median household income, and 
population density as instrumental variables for the hog price. Gross state farm product 
and median household income are used as instrumental variables for environmental 
stringency. Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) used median household income as 
an instrumental variable for environmental stringency. The reduced forms of hog price 
and environmental compliance (stringency) cost regression equations provide the first 
stage estimations. The first stage estimations are represented in (29) and (30) below:  
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(29)  
kttkktktkt
ktktktktit
TKincomepdpbeef
eNltranslaborfeedp
ωλλλλλ
λλλλ
+++++
++++=
876
4321 arg
 
(30) 
kttkktktktkt
ktktktktit
TKincomepdpbeefgsfar
eNltranslaborfeedEnvir
ηαααααα
αααα
++++++
++++=
8765
4321 arg
 
where pbeef , income  , gsfar, and pd  refer to price of beef, median household income, 
gross farm product, and population density, respectively.  
The predicted values from (29) and (30) are used in place of itp  and itEnvir  in 
the system of equations in (26)-(28) which represent the second stage estimation. The 
system of equations in (26)-(28) is estimated using the seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) econometric procedure. All model specifications are in log-log form except for the 
time variable and the fixed effects variables.   
2.5.3. Description of Data and Variables  
The study uses data for the top ten hog producing states for the years 1994 through 2006.  
The states which constitute the top ten hog producing states include: Iowa (IA), North 
Carolina (NC), Minnesota (MN), Illinois (IL), Nebraska (NE), Indiana (IN), Missouri 
(MO), Oklahoma (OK), Ohio (OH), and Kansas (KS).  Our choice to consider the ten 
major hog producing states was motivated by the fact that these states account for about 
85% of the total U.S. hog production.  
Dependent variables 
Based on our theoretical model, our empirical model uses three dependent variables. 
These variables include: the state-level total hog inventory for SHFOs; the state-level 
total hog inventory for LHFOs; and the state-level number of SHFOs. The variables 
are described in detail below. 
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The state level total hog production inventories for SHFOs and LHFOs are 
designed to measure the aggregate supply of hogs from SHFOs and LHFOs, respectively. 
In this study SHFOs are defined as operations that raise 1-999 head and LHFOs are 
defined as operations that raise 1000 head and above. These two variables are solutions to 
the aggregate form of the first-order conditions in equation (4). Roe, Irwin and Sharpe 
(2002) used hog inventories as the depended variable to study the spatial structure of the 
U.S hog industry. Metcalfe (2001) used the percentage share of total U.S. hog inventory 
to study the effect of environmental regulations on hog production for 18 U.S. major hog 
producing states.  
The Number of hog operations is designed to measure the equilibrium number 
of SHFOs in the U.S hog industry. The endogeneity of this variable stems from the 
determination of the number of small farms by the zero profit condition in equation (7), 
in our theoretical model.  However, in this analysis, the number of large farms is treated 
as an exogenous variable for several reasons. The following reasons are behind our 
treatment of this variable as exogenous: (1) it takes a long-time to come up with a highly 
mechanized farm; (2) when such a large mechanized farm enters the industry, evidence 
from industry does support the fact that such farms rarely exit the industry; and (3) if we 
were to make both the number of large farms and the number of small farms endogenous, 
we will not get an analytical solution to the theoretical model. 
Explanatory variables 
The Environmental stringency variable measures the number of state-level 
environmental regulations on HFOs. Data on state-level environmental stringency indices 
is not readily available. For each state, we make use of a 1994-2006 time series 
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qualitative environmental stringency data in this study.  Several studies have used 
qualitative environmental stringency indices to study environmental stringency issues in 
the U.S hog industry (Metcalfe, 2000; Metcalfe, 2001; Roe, Irwin and Sharp, 2002; 
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier, 2005b). For the period 1994 - 2002, we make use of 
the qualitative environmental stringency indices for 1994-1999 and 2000-2002 
constructed by Metcalfe (2000), and Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b), 
respectively. 
 To complete the 1994-2006 time series, we construct environmental stringency indices 
for the years 2003 -2006 using the methodology employed by Metcalfe (2000).24 The 
2003-2006 stringency values incorporate the 2003 revisions to the Clean Water Act 
regulations governing animal feeding operations which most states adopted as soon as 
they were announced. We argue that hog farmers are forward looking (Metcalfe 2001), 
hence the 2003-2006 stringency values are the same. In addition, we update the 
stringency indices constructed by Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) to match the 
methodology used by Metcalfe (2000). Table 7 documents the 1994-2006 environmental 
stringency data for the top ten U.S. hog producing states.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 The construction of the 2003-2006 environmental stringency values is documented in appendix C. 
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Table 7: State-level Environmental Stringency 1994-2006 Time Series Data 
State 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Illinois 2 2 2 2 8 8 9 9 9 14 14 14 14 
Indiana 4 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 13 13 13 13 
Iowa 4 4 4 4 9 9 10 10 10 13 13 13 13 
Kansas 4 4 4 4 9 9 9 9 9 13 13 13 13 
Minnesota 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 13 13 13 13 
Missouri 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 8 12 12 12 12 
Nebraska 3 3 3 3 7 7 9 9 9 12 12 12 12 
North 
Carolina 1 1 1 1 8 8 9 9 9 14 14 14 14 
Ohio 5 5 5 5 7 7 9 9 9 12 12 12 12 
Oklahoma 4 4 4 4 6 6 9 9 9 13 13 13 13 
Source: Metcalfe (2000), Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005) and author’s estimates (2003-2006) 
 
The indices reported for 1994-1999 match the indices reported in Metcalfe (2000). To 
update the 2000 index constructed by Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b), we 
tracked the changes in individual regulations between 1998 and 2000 as reported in 
Metcalfe (2000) and Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b), respectively. Comparing 
the two indices, we determined if a state adopted a new regulation after 1998. If a new 
regulation was added as reflected in 2000, we added the regulation to the 1998 index to 
construct the 2000 index.  Both studies constructed their indices in a similar way except 
that that Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) did not build on Metcalfe (2000) to 
calculate their initial index. Without reconciling the ways in which the indices were 
constructed, the time series would not make sense. The time series data shows that 
environmental regulations have been increasing over the years.  
The environmental stringency variable is endogenous because regulations may 
increase in states that are experiencing increasing hog production while states with low 
environmental regulations may realize increased hog production (Metcalfe 2001). Our 
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theoretical results shown in equations (16)-(18) suggest that the effect of environmental 
stringency on the output of SHFOs, LHFOs, and the number of SHFOs are ambiguous. A 
positive (negative) sign on the environmental stringency variable on regressions 
involving the outputs of LHFOs and SHFOs suggests that environmental stringency has 
the effect of increasing (decreasing) the output of LHFOs and SHFOs. A positive 
(negative) coefficient on the environmental stringency variable on the regression which 
uses the number of SHFOs as the dependent variable suggests that environmental 
regulations have the effect of increasing (decreasing) the number of SHFOs in the U.S 
hog industry.  
The hog output price variable is endogenous in our model as it is associated with 
the demand side of the industry. Metcalfe (2001) used the hog price predicted values to 
address the endogeneity of hog output price. By the monotonicity property of the supply 
function, we expect a positive sign on hog output price in the supply equations. In the 
number of SHFOs equation a positive sign is expected on the hog price variable if an 
increase in the price of hogs attracts new entrants. This sign will also depend on whether 
the increase in the hog price is short-term or long-term. A short-term increase may not 
increase entrants, but if the price increase is long-term, then the number of SHFOs should 
increase. 
 The Corn price variable is designed to measure the cost of hog feed input. Corn 
is an input in hog production which constitutes a greater percentage of hog feed. Several 
studies used corn price as an input to study the effect of environmental regulations on hog 
production (Metcalfe, 2001; Roe, Irwin and Sharp, 2002). Other studies addressing the 
livestock industry also used corn as an input. We expect hog supply to decrease with an 
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increase in the price of feed corn. Specifically, production costs increase with a higher 
price of corn, reducing the quantity of hogs supplied. The corn price has an ambiguous 
effect on the number of SHFOs. When the price of corn goes up, some SHFOs may exit 
the industry reducing the number of small operations. Higher corn prices also increase the 
price of hogs, leading to positive profits which will attract new entry by SHFOs. Entry by 
new SHFOs will drive the price down to a new equilibrium price higher than the original 
price or back to the original equilibrium price. If the equilibrium price reverts back to the 
original equilibrium price then there will be an effect on the number of SHFOs only in 
the short-run and not in the long-run. However, if the increase in the price of corn leads 
to a higher new equilibrium price in the long-run we expect the number of small firms to 
decrease in the long-run.  
Farm labor measures the cost of labor used in hog production. We use the 
average hourly state-level hourly wages as a proxy for farm labor wages. Metcalfe 
(2001), and Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) also used farm labor wages to 
capture the cost of farm labor input. A negative sign is expected on farm-labor wages on 
regressions involving the supply of SHFOs and LHFOs. We expect the increase in farm 
labor wages to either have no effect or to negatively affect the number of SHFOs, 
depending on whether the wage increase is short term or long-term. Some SHFOs may 
exit the industry if the rise in wages greatly affects their profits making it difficult to 
continue operating. If the reaction of SHFOs to increased farm labor wages is a shift from 
labor to capital inputs (i.e, machinery), the number of small operations may not be 
affected. Long-run impacts will be similar to those described for corn prices. 
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Transportation cost measures the cost of transporting several commodities used 
in hog production. Energy price is a popular proxy for transportation cost in livestock 
industry studies as well as meatpacking industry studies. Azzam (1997), Metcalfe (2001), 
and Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) used energy price as a proxy for 
transportation cost in studies related to the livestock industry. The supply function is 
decreasing in input prices; hence, we expect a negative sign on the transportation cost 
variable. The effect of transportation cost on the number of SHFOs is either to decrease 
or have no effect the number of SHFOs. The sign on the transportation cost variable will 
depend in part on whether the increase in transportation cost is short term or long-term. If 
the increase in the price of transportation is long-term, some SHFOs may shut down and 
exit the industry. However, if the price increase is short-term, the number of SHFOs may 
not be affected in the long-run. 
 The Number of LHFOs variable is treated as exogenous in our model. This 
variable is designed to test whether any crowding-out effect exists in the hog industry. 
When the number of LHFOs increases, SHFOs may be squeezed out of the industry. 
Alternatively, the increase in the number of LHFOs may attract more entry by SHFOs 
into the industry, due to agglomeration economies (i.e. the benefit HFOs enjoy from 
locating close to each other.). The overall direction of change will help partially explain 
the dynamics of different size HFOs over the years. Our theoretical model derives the 
effect of environmental regulations on the outputs for SHFOs and LHFOs and the 
number of SHFOs. Analytical results, as shown in equations (16) and (17), suggest that 
the number of LHFOs has a negative effect on the outputs of SHFOs and LHFOs.  
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However, the result on the effect of the number of LHFOs on the number of 
SHFOs in (18) is inconclusive. Based on the theoretical predictions, we expect the signs 
on the number of LHFOs variable to be negative in the regressions involving the outputs 
for SHFOs and LHFOs, while the impact on the number of SHFOs is ambiguous.  
Table 8 provides the source and variable description for the data used in the empirical 
analysis and Table 9 shows the summary statistics for the data. 
 
Table 8: Variable Definition and Data Sources 
Definition of variables  Source 
Small hog farms total inventory  USDA-NASS 
Large hog farms total inventory  USDA-NASS 
Number of small hog farms  USDA-NASS 
Number of large hog farms  USDA-NASS 
Hog price: Dollars/Cwt(100 weight) 
NASS Agricultural Prices 
Summaries- USDA  
Corn price: Dollars/Bushel  
NASS Agricultural Prices 
Summaries- USDA 
Transportation cost: cents per gallon:  
Energy Information 
Administration 
Environmental Stringency  
 1993-2002: Metcalfe(2000) 
and Herath, Weersink, and 
Carpentier (2005) 
2003-2006 indices: author's 
estimates 
Farm labor: Dollars/Hour  Farm labor-NASS-USDA 
Cattle all beef price: Dollars/Cwt 
 NASS Agricultural Prices 
Summaries- USDA 
Income: personal per capita income/Dollars 
 Almanac of the 50 States 
Information Publications 
Population density(pd): persons per square mile  
 Almanac of the 50 States 
Information Publications 
GSPFARM in million dollars; gross state farm 
product: includes agricultural services, forestry and 
fisheries 
 Almanac of the 50 States 
Information Publications 
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
LHFO inventory 39985 35640 4454.5 154630 
SHFO inventory 9712.2 11715 665 75400 
Number of LHFOs 1058.5 1022.2 60 4400 
Number of SHFOs 4780 3734.6 935 25100 
Hog price 42.19 4.28 33.52 54.48 
Corn price 2.34 0.47 1.64 3.99 
Transport 101.16 31.17 59.8 179.7 
Labor 8.2 0.79 6.6 10 
Population density 112.5 84.22 21.1 280.3 
Environ stringency 8.41 3.71 1 14 
Cattle price 69.17 7.83 49.8 91.7 
Per capita income 27191.73 2549.95 21311.4 33264.7 
Gspfarm 2839.09 1339.66 355.9 6333.8 
All dollar values are in year 2000 dollars. The Consumer Price Index was used to convert all nominal 
values to real terms. 
2.5.4. Empirical Results  
Empirical results in Tables 10-12 are based on Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions estimation procedure of the three equation system, (26)-(28). The Breusch-
Pagan (B-P) LM test for diagonal covariance matrix rejects the hypothesis that the off 
diagonal elements of the covariance matrix are all zero. The B-P LM test result justifies 
our use of the SUR estimation procedure rather than estimating the individual equations 
by ordinary least squares. We failed to reject the null hypothesis that the slopes of the 
cost parameters in (26) and (28) are equal. We test for this restriction based on the long-
run equilibrium condition for SHFOs, ss acmcp == . In addition, since the long-run 
equilibrium price is determined by SHFOs, we also test whether or not the following 
restriction holds sls acmcmcp === . The null hypothesis that the slopes of cost 
parameters in the three regression equations are the same was not rejected. We failed to 
reject the null hypothesis that the supply function for SHFOs is homogenous of degree 
zero in output price and input prices. On the other hand, the null hypothesis that the 
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supply function for LHFOs is homogenous of degree zero in output price and input prices 
was rejected. 
 Results in Table 10 present the unrestricted SUR, Table 11 results are based on a 
SUR model with cross-equation restrictions on the equality of cost parameter slopes 
imposed on (26) and (28) and the homogeneity restriction imposed on (26), and results in 
Table 12 are based on a SUR model with cross-equation restrictions on the equality of 
cost parameter slopes imposed on (26)-(28) and the homogeneity restriction imposed on 
(26). 
The unrestricted SUR results in Table 10 suggest that environmental regulations 
had a negative and statistically significant effect on the supply of both LHFOs and 
SHFOs, and the number of SHFOs.  These results suggest that environmental regulations 
significantly contributed to the changing structure of the U.S hog industry during the 
period, 1994- 2006. Specifically, regulation played an important role in the reduction of 
the number of SHFOs in the U.S hog industry. In addition, regulation forced both LHFOs 
and SHFOs to reduce hog supplies. 
 The coefficients on the effect of the number of LHFOs on the supply of SHFOs 
and LHFOs, and the number of SHFOs are all positive and statistically significant. These 
results suggest that HFOs benefit with the increase of LHFOs through spillover effects 
such as transmission of new methods of hog production and facility management. 
Empirical results also provide evidence against any crowding-out effect as the increase in 
the number of large hog operations has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
number of incumbent small hog feeding operations, a result that is consistent with Kuo 
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(2005). The trend in the reduction of the number of SHFOs was not due to the increase in 
the number of LHFOs.  
 The coefficients on hog price do have the expected positive sign for regressions 
involving the supply of SHFOs and the number of SHFOs. However, the coefficient on 
hog price in the regression involving the supply of LHFOs is negative and statistically 
significant. While the coefficients on transportation cost, corn price and labor do have the 
expected negative signs for the regression involving LHFOs hog supply, only coefficients 
on transportation cost and labor have the expected negative signs while the coefficient on 
corn price is positive but insignificant in the SHFO hog supply regression. Only the 
coefficient on labor has the expected sign in the regression that uses the number of 
SHFOs as the dependent variable. While the coefficients on transportation cost and corn 
price have unexpected positive signs, they are statistically insignificant in the number of 
SHFO regression. 
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Table 10: Regression results using fixed effects and the time variable 
 Ln(OSHFO) Ln(OLHFO) Ln(NSHFO) 
Variable   Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient  T-Stat  Coefficient  T-Stat 
CONSTANT 6.003 4.403*** 8.28 8.477*** 5.961 5.105*** 
Ln(Hog Price) 0.614 1.612 -0.452 -1.656* 0.009 0.002 
Ln(Corn Price) 0.007 0.847 -0.103 -1.574 0.005 0.751 
Ln(Labor) -0.691 -1.762* -0.287 -1.02 -0.957 -2.847*** 
Ln(Transcost) -0.197 -0.764 -0.021 -0.116 0.117 0.532 
Ln(NLHFOs) 0.629 6.343*** 0.728 10.238*** 0.692 8.14*** 
Ln(Stringency) -0.181 -1.926* -0.331 -4.907*** -0.23 -2.854*** 
T 
-0.006 -2.21** 0.008 3.817*** -0.008 -3.237*** 
IL 
-0.395 -2.757*** -0.443 -4.316*** -0.004 -0.371 
IN 
-0.485 -2.882*** -0.485 -4.019*** 0.007 0.52 
KS 
-0.778 -2.606*** -0.154 -0.72 0.343 1.341 
MN 
-0.293 -2.399** -0.218 -2.484*** 0.148 1.415 
MO 
-0.513 -2.307** -0.006 -0.428 0.329 1.729* 
NE 
-0.235 -1.345 -0.454 -3.629*** 0.164 1.098 
NC 
-2.63 -22.285*** 0.365 4.315*** -1.051 -10.404*** 
OH 
-0.241 -1.042 -0.943 -5.688*** 0.862 4.351*** 
OK 
-1.321 -3.75*** 0.523 2.075** 1.02 3.382*** 
R-Square 
 0.985  0.985  0.969 
Note for Table 10: The dependent variables are: log of SHFOs output (Ln (OSHFO)); log of LHFOs output 
(Ln (OLHFO)); and log of the number of SHFOs (Ln (NSHFO)). P-values are indicated as ***0.01, **0.05 
and *0.10. 
 
The state-level fixed effects dummy variables are for nine states excluding the state of 
Iowa.  The time-effects are for the 13 years from 1994-2006. Both the fixed effects and 
time effects are assumed to be exogenous to the model. 
The restricted SUR results in Table 11 provide the same conclusions as results in 
Table 10 for the key parameters we are interested in. That is, the coefficients on the 
environmental stringency variable are all negative and statistically significant. The sign 
of the hog price variable is unexpected in the LHFO hog supply regression and has the 
expected sign in the other two regressions. The coefficients on the transportation, corn, 
and labor price variables are as predicted in the LHFO supply estimation. The imposed 
restrictions had an effect on the cost parameters in the SHFO hog supply and number of 
68 
 
SHFOs regressions. The coefficient on labor is negative and statistically significant, 
while the coefficients on corn price and transportation cost are positive and statistically 
insignificant in the HFO hog supply and number of SHFOs regressions. The number 
coefficient on the number of LHFOs remains positive and highly statistically significant 
in all the three regressions.  
 
Table 11: SUR Regression results with restrictions on the cost parameters of equations 1 and 3 and 
homogeneity restriction on equation 1 
 Ln(OSHFO) Ln(OLHFO) Ln(NSHFO) 
Variable   Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient  T-Stat  Coefficient  T-Stat 
CONSTANT 5.758 5.952*** 8.361 8.636*** 4.574 5.023*** 
Ln(Hog Price) 0.28 0.859 -0.441 -1.624 0.134 0.421 
Ln(Corn Price) 0.091 1.244 -0.105 -1.619 0.091 1.244 
Ln(Labor) -0.471 -3.307*** -0.321 -1.154 -0.471 -3.307*** 
Ln(Transcost) 0.099 0.474 -0.035 0.195 0.099 0.474 
Ln(NLHFOs) 0.609 6.281*** 0.73 10.321*** 0.682 8.045*** 
Ln(Stringency) -0.155 -1.763* -0.334 -4.981*** -0.198 -2.522*** 
T 
-0.096 -4.255*** 0.081 3.94*** -0.088 -3.988*** 
IL 
-0.444 -3.218*** -0.44 -4.314*** -0.052 0.428 
IN 
-0.529 -3.228*** -0.483 -4.022*** 0.07 0.49 
KS 
-0.853 -2.924*** -0.15 0.704 0.334 1.305 
MN 
-0.352 -3.117*** -0.213 -2.447*** 0.113 1.132 
MO 
-0.555 -2.557*** -0.068 0.43 0.376 1.967** 
NE 
-0.245 -1.421 -0.455 -3.655*** 0.188 1.249 
NC 
-2.602 -24.342*** 0.36 4.291*** -0.984 -10.467*** 
OH 
-0.284 -1.252 -0.941 -5.71 0.87 4.372*** 
OK 
-1.389 -4.017*** 0.526 2.096** 1.044 3.445*** 
R-Square 
 0.985  0.986  0.968 
Note for Table 11: The dependent variables are: log of SHFOs output (Ln (OSHFO)); log of LHFOs output 
(Ln (OLHFO)); and log of the number of SHFOs (Ln (NSHFO)). P-values are indicated as ***0.01, **0.05 
and *0.10. 
  
The restricted SUR results in Table 12 also suggest that environmental regulations had a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the supply of both LHFOs and SHFOs, and 
the number of SHFOs.  The coefficients on the effect of the number of LHFOs on the 
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supply of SHFOs and LHFOs and number of SHFOs remain positive and statistically 
significant.  
 The coefficients on hog price do have the expected positive sign for regressions 
involving the supply of SHFOs and the number of SHFOs. However, the coefficient on 
hog price in the regression involving the supply of LHFOs is negative and statistically 
significant. The coefficients on corn price and labor do have the expected negative signs. 
While the coefficient on transportation cost has an unexpected positive sign, it is highly 
statistically insignificant.  
 
Table 12: SUR Regression results with restrictions on cost parameters of all equations and a 
homogeneity restriction for equation 1 
 Ln(OSHFO) Ln(OLHFO) Ln(NSHFO) 
Variable   Coefficient  T-stat  Coefficient  T-Stat  Coefficient  T-Stat 
CONSTANT 5.654 6.239*** 8.667 10.1*** 4.424 5.062*** 
Ln(Hog Price) 0.435 1.973* -0.566 -2.773*** 0.296 1.377 
Ln(Corn Price) -0.022 -0.487 -0.022 -0.487 -0.022 -0.487 
Ln(Labor) -0.43 -3.722*** -0.43 -3.722*** -0.43 -3.722*** 
Ln(Transcost) 0.016 0.131 0.016 0.131 0.016 0.131 
Ln(NLHFOs) 0.6 6.383*** 0.739 10.751*** 0.674 8.195*** 
Ln(Stringency) -0.201 -2.399*** -0.305 -4.649*** -0.242 -3.221*** 
T 
-0.085 -5.397*** 0.076 5.154*** -0.077 -5.115*** 
IL 
-0.443 -3.396*** -0.439 -4.543*** -0.048 -0.423 
IN 
-0.534 -3.414*** -0.478 -4.14*** 0.069 0.505 
KS 
-0.859 -3.067*** -0.143 -0.693 0.332 1.353 
MN 
-0.35 -3.286*** -0.208 -2.649*** 0.116 1.245 
MO 
-0.558 -2.674*** -0.072 -0.465 0.377 2.052** 
NE 
-0.265 -1.57 -0.444 -3.551*** 0.171 1.157 
NC 
-2.6 -24.546*** 0.347 4.243*** -0.98 -10.445*** 
OH 
-0.295 -1.344 -0.934 -5.751*** 0.863 4.473*** 
OK 
-1.397 -4.191*** 0.528 2.141** 1.042 3.558*** 
R-Square 
 0.985  0.986  0.968 
Note for Table 12: The dependent variables are: log of SHFOs output (Ln (OSHFO)); log of LHFOs output 
(Ln (OLHFO)); and log of the number of SHFOs (Ln (NSHFO)). P-values are indicated as ***0.01, **0.05 
and *0.10. 
 
70 
 
It is important to note that the restrictions imposed on results in Tables 11 and12 
do not change the conclusions regarding the effect of regulation on the long-run 
equilibrium of the U.S. hog industry. We can use our empirical results to estimate the 
effect of regulation on average farm-size as reflected by the changes in the scale of hog 
production. This will help explain whether there exist positive or negative regulation 
farm-size biases for the two HFO sizes.  
2.5.5. Regulation and Average Farm-size  
We use results in Tables 10-12 to approximate the effect of regulation on average farm-
size or scale of hog production. The change in the number of head per unit for SHFOs 
due to regulation is given by: 
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Using the result in (31), the effect of regulation on the output for a representative SHFO 
is given by the product of 
s
s
N
Q E  and 0.049, 0.043, and 0.041 based on results reported in 
Tables 10, 11, and 12, respectively. 
Making use of (27), the change in the number of head per unit for LHFOs due to 
regulation is given by: 
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Using the result in (32), the effect of regulation on a representative LHFO is negative 
since 6γ  is estimated to be -0.331, -0.334, and -0.305, based on results reported in Tables 
10, 11, and 12, respectively. With the variables evaluated at their respective means, these 
impacts are given in Table 13.  
 
Table 13: Effect of regulation on an average HFO 
Results used Effect on a SHFO Effect on a LHFO 
Table 10 0.003 -0.001 
Table 11 0.003 -0.001 
Table 12 0.002 -0.001 
Note for Table 13: Results are in thousand head. 
 These results show that positive and negative farm-size biases exist for SHFOs and 
LHFOs, respectively. This result suggests that regulation increases the average SHFO 
farm size and reduces the average LHFO farm size. In other words, the scale of hog 
production for SHFOs increases while that of LHFOs decreases. 
2.6: Summary and Conclusions 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the effect of environmental regulations 
on the entry and exit of small U.S hog farms. To address this question we develop a 
theoretical model that addresses supply shifts due to environmental regulation 
compliance costs in a perfectly competitive hog industry in the long-run. Theoretical 
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results on the long-run effects of regulation on the output of SHFOs, large-HFOs and the 
number of SHFOs are inconclusive.  
Among the factors important in the determination of the direction of change in the 
endogenous variables due to regulation include the nature of regulation and technology. 
Embedded in the cost of regulation are important regulation characteristics which 
include: regulation farm-size bias and regulation input bias.  Positive (negative) 
regulation farm-size bias occurs when the regulation induced shift in the average cost 
curve is greater (lower) than the shift in the marginal cost curve. How the shift in 
marginal cost curve compares to the shift in the average cost curve is central to the 
ambiguity of our theoretical results.   
Whether the pre-and post-regulation increase shifts both the marginal-and average 
cost curves or not could be a result of the nature of the pre-and post-regulation underlying 
technology. This is another way the shifts in the marginal-and average cost curves may 
differ. When the pre-and post-regulation increase underlying technologies are 
homothetic, regulation shifts only the average cost curve. In this case, the shift in average 
cost is greater than the shift in marginal cost (zero). On the other hand, regulation may 
shift both marginal-and average cost curves. The direction of change will depend on how 
the shift in the marginal cost curve compares to the shift in the average cost curve. In 
addition, the importance of the different HFO size technologies is important in 
determining the direction of change of our theoretical results. Because of the complexity 
of the various regulation induced effects, the overall impact is an empirical question. 
Prior studies argue that incumbent HFOs may pose as an entry barrier to potential 
entrants. In the U.S. hog industry, the question is whether incumbent LHFOs act as an 
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entry deterrent and whether their presence leads to the exit of SHFOs. Theory also 
suggested that the presence of a large number of LHFOs have a negative effect on the 
outputs of SHFOs and LHFOs, and the effect on the number of SHFOs is ambiguous. 
Based on the theoretical model, we developed an empirical model to help explain how 
regulation affected the entry and exit of U.S. hog farms for the period 1994-2006.  
Empirical results suggest that environmental regulations had a negative and 
statistically significant effect on hog supply for both SHFOs and LHFOs, and the number 
of SHFOs.  These results suggest that environmental regulations significantly affected the 
entry and exit of U.S. hog farms thereby contributing to the changing structure of the U.S 
hog industry during the period, 1994- 2006. Specifically, regulation played an important 
role in the exit of the number of SHFOs in the U.S hog industry in the last two decades.  
In addition, regulation compliance cost forced both SHFOs and LHFOs to reduce hog 
supplies.  
 The coefficients on the effect of the presence of a large number of LHFOs in a 
state on the supply of SHFOs, LHFOs, and the number of SHFOs are all positive and 
statistically significant. These results suggest that all HFO size categories benefit from 
the existence of a large number of LHFOs in a state ruling out the argument that 
incumbent LHFOs pose a threat to SHFOs.  HFOs may benefit from incumbent LHFOs 
through learning from LHFOs in areas such as technological improvements. LHFOs are 
likely to bear the risk of adopting new technology and SHFOs are likely to wait and adopt 
only the successful technologies through learning. SHFOs will save the cost of the risk 
associated with adoption of technologies that are not cost effective. In addition, the 
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presence of agglomeration economies where HFOs benefit from locating next to other 
HFOs could be behind this result. 
Therefore, the trend in the reduction of the number of SHFOs was not due to the 
existence of a large number of LHFOs. The existence of a large number of LHFOs serves 
as an entry attraction for SHFOs. State-level policies targeted at saving family farms 
should take into account the fact that improving the cooperation between SHFOs and 
LHFOs does benefit SHFOs. Encouraging cooperation between SHFOs and LHFOs will 
help save family farms. We can infer from our results that, policies aimed at discouraging 
LHFOs can be detrimental to the survival of SHFOs henceforth, the survival of the hog 
industry. 
Based on our empirical results, we examined how regulation affects the average 
farm-size of the two HFO size categories. Results suggest that regulation increases and 
decreases the average farm-size for a representative SHFO and LHFO, respectively. This 
suggests that the output of an individual SHFO increases with regulation. In other words, 
the scale of hog production by an individual SHFO increases implying that the average 
size of an incumbent SHFO increases with regulation.  This could be due to SHFOs 
acquiring better machinery to cope with regulation compliance. This could be a result of 
obsolete technology that LHFOs had acquired earlier which can still have an effect of 
altering SHFO scale of production. On the other hand, the output for an individual LHFO 
decreases with regulation. This result implies that the average size of an incumbent 
LHFO decreases with regulation.  
In conclusion, environmental regulations are responsible for the exit of SHFO in the hog 
industry. Since regulation, leads to an increase in the average size of incumbent SHFOs, 
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this could act as an entry barrier for potential SHFO entrants. If this is true, policies to 
save SHFOs should be targeted on SHFOs and not LHFOs as explained earlier. 
Regulation is also responsible for the reduction in the supply of hogs by SHFOs and 
LHFOs.  
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Chapter 3: The Reorganization of U.S. Hog Production during the past two decades: 
What were the driving forces?   
 
3.1. Introduction 
This essay examines the importance of input availability, market attractiveness, 
agglomeration economies and environmental regulations on the reorganization of U.S. 
hog production for a panel of 22 U.S. hog producing states for the period 1994-2006. 
Results from this study suggest that: 
1. Hog production in a state is positively affected by hog production in a nearby 
state, confirming the presence of agglomeration economies. 
2.  Environmental regulations and high corn prices have negative effects on state-
level U.S. hog production.   
3. High hog prices, favorable labor cost, and low land values attract hog production.  
4. Transportation cost has no effect on hog production. 
 Based on these results, we conclude that agglomeration economies, regulation, market 
attractiveness and factors of production were important in shaping the reorganization of 
the U.S. hog industry for the period 1994-2006. The result on agglomeration economies 
contrasts the result by Roe, Irwin and Sharp (2002). They found a negative and 
statistically insignificant result based on two data points, 1992 and 1997. However, our 
result on agglomeration economies is consistent with their result based only on 1997 data. 
The result on regulation confirms the result that regulation slows down hog production 
(Metcalfe, 2001; Roe, Irwin and Sharp, 2002; Kuo, 2005; and Herath, Weersink, and 
Carpentier, 2005b).  
The U.S. hog production industry has been the subject of structural changes, 
increase in environmental regulations, and geographical concentration during the past 
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two decades. The industry, once dominated by small family farm operations, has evolved 
toward large specialized operations characterized by low costs (McBride and Key, 2003). 
The U.S. hog industry consisted of about 3 million farms during the 1950s. Of interest in 
this study are the factors behind the reorganization toward a more geographically 
concentrated industry over the last two decades.  
U.S. hog production has become geographically concentrated within-and across 
states (Hubbell and Welsh, 1998; Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier, 2005a) during the 
past two decades.  Hubbell and Welsh (1998) provided one of the earliest studies to 
formally address geographical concentration in the hog industry. Based on Theil’s 
entropy index, showed that hog production is becoming more geographically 
concentrated at the national level and within states. Recently, Herath, Weersink, and 
Carpentier (2005a), making use of the Gini coefficient to measure concentration, 
confirmed the finding that hog production is becoming more concentrated within states. 
The changes associated with the hog industry becoming more geographically 
concentrated have led to a non-uniform interregional distribution of hogs (Hubbell and 
Welsh, 1998).  
The geographical concentration of hog farms can have several lasting effects. 
Specifically, the changes in the hog production industry could: affect communities with 
changes in hog production levels; affect local supply and demand for key inputs and 
output; alter the economic base of communities; change the utilization of industry-
specific infrastructure and services; and concentrate nutrients from animal manure in 
fewer locations causing adverse environmental consequences (Roe, Irwin, and Sharp, 
2002).  
78 
 
The reorganization of an industry has been found to be affected by several factors 
including those internal to the firm; factors external to the firm but internal to the 
industry; and factors external to both the firm and the industry. Eberts and McMillen 
(1999) noted that firm-internal scale economies, industry internal scale economies 
(external economies to the firm), urbanization economies (external to both the firm and 
the industry), transportation costs, and regulatory stringency are important factors 
affecting firm location. The U.S. hog industry is not unique, such factors were found to 
be important to the U.S. hog industry by Roe, Irwin, and Sharp (2002) for the year 1997 
and between the years1992 and 1997. These factors are more than likely to have played 
an important role in the reorganization of U.S. hog production within and across states 
witnessed over the past two decades.  
This study addresses the importance of selected factors internal to the firm 
(factors of production), forces external to the firm but internal to the industry (the 
attractiveness of the market; agglomeration economies), and environmental regulation on 
the reorganization of U.S. hog production over time. Easy access to factors of production 
plays an important role on a farmer’s decision on whether or not to operate a hog 
operation facility in a particular state. The variation of input costs may lead to variations 
in input use through time.  Because such fluctuations are inevitable, the cost of the factors 
of production will pose a great challenge to existing and potential hog producers.  
Because one of the main reasons why farmers engage in hog production is to 
make a profit, the attractiveness of the market plays an important role in determining 
whether to engage in hog production in a particular location or not. High market prices 
will more than likely attract more farmers to engage in hog production. 
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Agglomeration economies are economies external to the farm but internal to the 
hog production sector. In this study, agglomeration economies are defined in the context 
of localization economies as all the benefits that accrue to hog production in one state as 
a result of hog production in a nearby state. Such spillovers are likely to arise because the 
presence of other hog feeding operations facilitates a local, industry-specific 
infrastructure of service individuals and information, which enhances the performance of 
each operation through reduced transaction costs and improved diffusion of production, 
financial and marketing information (Eberts and McMillen, 1999).  
Roe, Irwin and Sharp (2002) addressed the factors behind the reorganization of 
the hog production in a cross-section of counties for the years 1992 and 1997. They 
concluded that the presence of other swine farms has a positive effect on the inventory of 
hogs in a particular county based on a cross-section of counties and only 1997 data. They 
also found  hog production in one county to be negatively correlated with hog production 
in a nearby county using the change in hog production between 1992 and 1997 as the 
dependent variable.  
The other factor affecting the location of firms considered in this study is 
environmental regulation. Environmental regulations in the hog industry were introduced 
by the Federal government through the Clean Water Act of 1972. Most of the existing 
regulations, which vary across states, are enforced at the state-level (Metcalfe, 2000; and 
Centner, 2006). The variation in state-level policies regulating nonpoint-source pollution 
is mainly due to the design of Federal water policy laws, characteristics of the nonpoint-
source pollution, and characteristics of the states that have to deal with water quality 
issues (Sullivan, Vasavada and Smith, 2000).  
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Centner and Mullen (2002) argued that reductions in pollution could be a result of 
more effective enforcement of the existing regulations, rather than additional regulation. 
State-level environmental regulation stringency, as measured by the number of 
regulations, has been increasing over the years (Metcalfe, 2000). Environmental 
regulations are costly to the hog industry through regulation compliance costs (Metcalfe, 
2001). Such regulations are believed to have contributed to several changes in the 
industry including changes in operation size, organizational structure, and technological 
base during the past decade (McBride and Key, 2003).  
Several studies found evidence that environmental regulations have slowed down 
U.S. hog production (Metcalfe, 2001; Roe, Irwin and Sharp, 2002; Kuo, 2005; and 
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier, 2005b).  
 Metcalfe (2001) concluded that regulation has a negative effect on hog 
production. His study also finds regulation affects small hog operations and has no effect 
on large farms.  The result that regulation has a negative effect on hog production was 
confirmed by subsequent studies (Roe, Irwin and Sharpe, 2002; Herath, Weersink, and 
Carpentier, 2005b; Kuo, 2005). Kuo (2005) examined the determinants of small hog 
operation exits.  
While the U.S. hog industry has received wide research attention in recent years, 
the importance of agglomeration economies on U.S. hog production has received limited 
attention. To the best of our knowledge, only a single study by Roe, Irwin and Sharp 
(2002) addressed the importance of agglomeration economies on U.S. hog production. 
Accounting for agglomeration economies by making use of the spatial lag serves two 
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distinct purposes; firstly, it corrects spatial autocorrelation through the dependent variable 
and secondly, this variable captures whether agglomeration economies are present or not. 
Because the spatial lag captures the existence or absence of spatial 
autocorrelation, studies that did not account for agglomeration economies in this manner 
did not control for spatial autocorrelation. If positive or negative spatial autocorrelation 
exists in the hog industry, results of such studies are likely to be unbiased but inefficient 
(Anselin, 1988).  
The study by Roe, Irwin and Sharp (2002) is, however, limited in that it addresses the 
importance of agglomeration economies and regulation over a single year, 1997, and 
between two years, 1992 and 1997. Their finding that agglomeration economies existed 
in the hog industry in the year 1997 and that such economies did not exist between 1992 
and 1997, suggests that agglomeration economies are not important over time. Their 
study captures the initial wave of the effects. The period of the 90s marks the beginning 
of the rush to tighten regulations in the U.S. hog industry. Sorting out the true effects as 
they exist and whether they have persisted or changed over time is important to fully 
understand such effects (Dean, Brown and Stango, 2000). 
Such an analysis while useful in shedding light on the importance of 
agglomeration economies and other forces in the U.S. hog industry may not have 
captured the actual yearly changes of the importance of agglomeration economies.  Since 
their study is a county-wide cross-sectional study, we argue that it misses the variation of 
the importance of agglomeration economies through time. We believe that the importance 
of agglomeration economies and regulation in hog production is not likely to remain the 
same over time as such spillovers are likely to change over time due to several factors 
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including the changes in economy, e.g., recession, depression or boom. Economic 
hardships may disrupt or change the institutions central to the diffusion of production, 
marketing and financial information forcing farmers to go out of business.  
While the foregoing studies have been useful in the understanding of issues in 
U.S. hog production, to our knowledge, no study has investigated the importance of the 
factors affecting hog production accounting for agglomeration economies in the context 
of panel data. The current study will make use of panel data from 22 U.S. major hog 
producing states to address the importance of input availability, market attractiveness, 
agglomeration economies and environmental regulations. In addition, the current study 
differs from prior studies in that it incorporates the most recent environmental stringency 
indices as well as a more current data set. The environmental indices used in prior studies 
were the 1994 and 1998 indices constructed by Metcalfe (2000) and the 2000 index 
constructed by Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b). These indices do not take into 
account the 2003 changes to the Clean Water Act of 1972, which we incorporate in our 
index calculations.  
We further argue that evidence of positive spatial autocorrelation (agglomeration 
economies) at county-level hog production may or may not reflect state-level spatial 
effects. The evidence of county-level agglomeration economies results may have mostly 
captured linkages between counties within the same state, rather than counties across 
state boundaries. A hog producer in one state might share benefits of proximity to a hog 
producer in another state.  Even if county-level local economies were to reflect state-level 
agglomeration economies, our state-level analysis captures variations of agglomeration 
economies over time which is missing in prior studies. The importance of agglomeration 
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economies is likely to change through time. Such changes can only be captured by 
making use of panel data or time series data. The foregoing argument provides a strong 
reason why the importance of addressing the factors affecting state-level hog production 
after accounting for spatial autocorrelation (agglomeration economies) over time is worth 
pursuing, henceforth, the focus of the current study.  
To address this problem, we make use of a simple profit maximization model for 
a theoretical framework.  The empirical analysis is based on three alternative models; 
ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares-spatial lag model (2SLS-SLM) and 
generalized method of moments-spatial autoregressive (GMM-SAR). Results from the 
three alternative models are then used to determine the model that best fits the data.  
While the effects of the other factors can be examined using all three models, 
agglomeration economies can only be examined using the 2SLS-SLM model. Our study 
also tests for spatial autocorrelation through the error term using the GMM-SAR model. 
We discuss more on how we come up with the best model for the data in the next section. 
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents literature review 
on spatial models; Section 3 presents the theoretical model; Section 4 presents the 
empirical model and data; Section 5 presents the results; and Section 6 provides the 
results discussion and conclusions. 
3.2. Review of Spatial models 
Cross-sectional models that assume that the dependent variable corresponding to each 
cross-sectional unit depends (in part) on a weighted average of that dependent variable 
corresponding to neighboring cross-sectional units are called spatial autoregressive 
models (Anselin, 1988). The weighted average itself is referred to as a spatial lag of the 
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dependent variable. According to Ord (1975) and Anselin (1988), the spatially lagged 
dependent variable is usually correlated with the error term rendering the ordinary least 
squares estimator inconsistent.  
The standard spatial autoregressive model, popularly known as the spatial lag 
model (SLM) is defined as follows: 
(33) ),0(~ 2 nIN
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 where y is the n x 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is the n x k 
matrix of observations on k exogenous variables, W is an n x n spatial weighting matrix 
of known constants, β is the k x 1 vector of regression parameters, λ is a scalar 
autoregressive parameter , and µ  is the n x 1 vector of disturbances.  
An alternative way is to use the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model, which 
operates through the spatial error structure. This model is applied if the researcher 
believes that the spatial dependence stems from omitted variables that are related to each 
other over space. The model is defined as follows: 
(34) 
),0(~ 2 nIN
W
Xy
σε
εµρµ
µβ
+=
+=
, 1|| <ρ    ,                                                                
 where µ is the n x 1 vector of disturbances and ε is the n x 1 vector of innovations. The 
other parameters are as defined in the model in (33).  In the SAR model, the parameters 
of interest are ρ  and 2σ .  In addition to the (quasi) maximum likelihood and the 
moments estimator of  ρ suggested by Ord (1975), Kelijian and Prucha (1999) proposed 
a “generalized”  moments (GMM) approach for the estimation of the spatial 
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autoregressive parameter, ρ , which they proved to be as efficient as the popularly used 
standard maximum likelihood estimator.  
The models in (33) and (34) are special cases of the more general model referred 
to as a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances by Kelijian and 
Prucha (1998) as defined below: 
(35) 
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where y is the n x 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable, X is the n x k 
matrix of observations on k exogenous variables, W and M are n x n spatial weighting 
matrices of known constants, β is the k x 1 vector of regression parameters, λ and ρ are 
scalar autoregressive parameters , µ  is the n x 1 vector of disturbances, and ε  is a nx1 
vector of innovations. By setting 0=ρ , the model in (35) reduces to the model 
represented in (33), and setting 0=λ yields the model in (34). In the more general 
model, the lack of spatial correlation results when 0== ρλ .  
Kelijian and Prucha (1998) proposed a generalized spatial two-stage least squares 
(GS2SLS) procedure for estimating the spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive 
disturbances. Their model allowed for the possibility that the spatial weight matrix 
associated with the error term and that associated with the dependent variable is the same, 
that is, WM = . The generalized spatial two-stage least squares approach is a three-step 
procedure. In the first step the regression model in (35) is estimated by two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) using some instruments.  
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The instrument matrices used are a subset of the linearly independent columns 
of, ),,,...,,,( 22 XMWMWXMXXWWXX ,where the subset contains the linearly 
independent columns of ),( XXM . In the second step the autoregressive parameter ρ is 
estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure suggested by Kelijian 
and Prucha (1995). According to Kelijian and Prucha, the GMM estimation procedure 
yields a consistent estimator of ρ, whether or not the weight matrices for the dependent 
variable and the error term are equal. Finally, the regression model in (35) is re-estimated 
by 2SLS after transforming the model using the Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation to 
account for the spatial correlation as follows: 
First equation (35) is rewritten as follows: 
(36) 
εµρµ
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where ),( WyXZ =  and )','( λβδ = . A Cochrane-Orcutt type transformation to this 
model yields: 
(37) εδ += ** Zy ,                                                                                      
where Wyyy ρ−=*  and WZZZ ρ−=* . In general, the foregoing spatial models, (33), 
(34), and (35) are the popularly used models in spatial econometrics today. 
3.3. Theoretical Model 
We present a simple profit maximization model for our theoretical framework. Hog 
production is assumed to utilize land, feed, labor, transportation, and the environment as 
inputs. The production function associated with hog production is therefore given by: 
),,,,( ETNLCfy = , where y ,C , L , N , T and E  represent the quantity of output, the 
quantity of corn feed, the quantity of land, the transportation input and the quantity of the 
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environmental input, respectively.  The environment is treated as an input in this model 
because hog producers incur a cost to utilize the environment in disposing of hog waste 
including manure.  
The production of hogs is costly, and the total cost of production is given by 
EwTwNwLwCwV ETNLC ++++= where,V , Cw , Lw , Nw , Tw and Ew represent total 
cost, hog price, price of feed, price of labor, price of land, transportation cost and 
environmental cost, respectively. The firm’s profit maximization problem in each state is 
given by: 
(38) EwTwNwLwCwpy ETNLCETNLC −−−−−=,,,,maxpi                                              
Solving the problem above yields the following first order conditions: 
(39) 
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Solving the above system of first-order conditions provides the following input or factor 
demand functions: 
(40) 
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By plugging in the input demand functions back into the profit function yields the 
indirect profit function given by: 
(41) ),,,,,(* ETNLC wwwwwppipi =                                                    
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The usual properties of the profit function are assumed to hold. The profit function is 
assumed to be homogenous of degree one in output and input prices. The partial 
derivative of the indirect profit function with respect to the output price, 0
*
>=
∂
∂ y
p
pi
. 
This inequality satisfies the property that the profit function is non-decreasing in output 
price. The partial derivatives of the indirect profit function with respect to input prices are 
negative by the envelope theorem, that is, 0*
*
<−=
∂
∂ i
wi
pi
, for TNLCi ,,,= and E . 
 By Hotelling’s Lemma, we can derive the optimal hog supply function for hogs 
from the indirect profit function given in (41), i.e. *
*
y
p
=
∂
∂pi
. The hog supply function is 
a function of the output price and all input prices. We can write the hog supply function 
as follows: 
(42) ),,,,,(* ETNLC wwwwwpyy = .                                                               
The effect of environmental costs on hog production will be captured by how 
environmental stringency affects hog supply. Given that we model environmental 
regulations as an input in the production of hogs, it follows that the comparative statics 
results of this effect on profit and the optimal hog supply are given by 0
*
<
∂
∂
Ew
pi
, and 
0
*
<
∂
∂
Ew
y
, respectively. This stems from one of the properties of the profit and supply 
functions that they are non-increasing in input prices. In Section 4 we present an 
empirical model that estimates the optimal supply function. Given the above comparative 
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static results, theory predicts that the effect of environmental regulations on hog 
production is negative. 
3.4. Empirical Model  
In this study we analyze the effect of environmental regulations on hog production for a 
panel consisting of 22 major hog producing states in the U.S. For an empirical framework 
we estimate models based on pooled OLS, the 2SLS-SLM in (1) using the two-stage least 
squares procedure developed by Kelijian and Prucha (1998), and the GMM-SAR model 
in (2) using the generalized method of moments (GMM) developed by Kelijian and 
Prucha (1999). We estimate and compare results for the Midwest, Northern-and Southern 
hog producing states to those based on all the 22 states.  
 If the 2SLS-SLM and the GMM-SAR models show that spatial autocorrelation 
through both the dependent variable and the error term exist, we will turn to the GS2SLS 
model which captures both spatial measures in a single model. If results show that spatial 
autocorrelation exists only through the dependent variable, then the 2SLS-SLM model 
will be the best model for the data and the GMM-SAR model will be the best model for 
the data if results show that spatial autocorrelation exists only through the error term.  
If both spatial autocorrelation parameters, one through the dependent variable and 
the other through the error term, are not statistically significant, then the OLS model 
estimates will be reliable.  Our strategy is to first check for the importance of all possible 
spatial autocorrelation sources to come up with the model that best explains the data.  
 Since the dimensions of the components of the spatial models in (1), (2) and (3) 
are for cross-sectional data, we redefine their components to suit the panel data model as 
follows: the dependent variable, y, is the nt x 1 vector of observations on hog output; X  
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is the nt x k matrix of observations on k exogenous variables; W is an nt x nt spatial 
weighting matrix of known constants, β  is the k x 1 vector of regression parameters, λ is 
a scalar autoregressive parameter , µ is the nt x 1 vector of disturbances, and ε  is the nt x 
1 vector of innovations. For the spatial weighting matrix, we use a standardized first-
order spatial contiguity matrix. We assign a “1” for states that share a common border 
and a “0” for states that do not share a common border.  Notice that a state cannot be its 
own neighbor, henceforth; the elements on the main diagonal of the first-order contiguity 
matrix are all set to zero. The spatial weight matrix is standardized by normalizing so that 
row sums add to unity (LeSage, 1997).  Several studies including Pan and LeSage (1995) 
and LeSage (1997), have used the first-order contiguity matrix in spatial econometrics.  
The menu of spatial models considered in this study is given below: 
                (33’) ),0(~ 2 tnIN
XWyy
σµ
µβλ ++=
, 1|| <λ ,                                                              
                (34’)
y = Xβ + µ
µ = ρWµ + ε
ε ~ N(0,σ 2In t )
, 1|| <ρ    ,                                                                
                (37’)      εδ += ** Zy ,                                                                                      
where models in (33’), (34’) and (37’) are panel data versions for models in (39), (40) 
and (43), respectively.  
The dependent and independent variables used in this study are defined next. The 
dependent variable, y, is the state level percentage share of U.S. total hog production. 
The state level percentage share of U.S. total hog production is used to capture state-level 
hog supply as in Metcalfe (2001). Roe, Irwin and Sharpe used the logarithm of U.S. hog 
production as the dependent variable which is not far from what we use here.  
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The specific independent variables contained in the X matrix include: hog output 
price; the cost of factors of production variables, corn price, farm labor, transportation 
cost, land price; and the environmental input cost (index).  
The hog output price is endogenous in our model as it is associated with the 
demand side of the industry. We make use of the predicted values for hog output price to 
take care of the endogeneity problem as in Metcalfe (2001).  A positive sign is expected 
since the higher the price of hogs, the more hog suppliers are willing to supply hogs. 
Corn price reflects the cost of the corn input in hog production which constitutes 
a greater percentage of hog feed. Several studies used corn price as an input to study the 
effect of environmental regulations on hog production (Metcalfe, 2001; Roe, Irwin and 
Sharp, 2002). We expect a negative sign on this variable since the higher the corn feed 
input price the lower the number of hogs hog producers are willing to supply. 
To capture the cost of farm labor in hog production, we use farm labor wages. 
Specifically we use the average hourly state-level wages as a proxy for farm labor wages. 
Metcalfe (2001), and Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b) also used farm labor 
wages to capture the cost of farm labor input. A negative sign on this variable is 
expected, that is, the higher the farm labor cost, the lower the number of hogs hog 
producers are willing to supply. 
 Land price captures the cost of land input in hog production. We use farm land 
price to capture land input cost in the same manner as in Metcalfe (2001), and Herath, 
Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b). We expect the coefficient on the land price variable to 
be negative. A negative sign shows that hog farmers supply fewer hogs as the price of 
land input goes up. 
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Transportation cost reflects the cost of transport input in hog production. We 
capture transportation cost using the price of unleaded gas. Energy price is a popular 
proxy for transportation cost in studies in livestock industry studies as well as 
meatpacking industry studies, e.g. Azzam (1997). Metcalfe (2001) and Herath, Weersink, 
and Carpentier (2005b) used the price of gas as a proxy for transportation cost in hog 
related studies. A negative sign is expected for this variable since it is a cost of an input 
in the hog production process.   
For the environmental index variable, we make use of a time series of qualitative 
environmental stringency indices constructed in the same manner as in Metcalfe (2000). 
Qualitative environmental stringency indices have been widely used in hog industry 
studies (Metcalfe, 2001; Roe, Irwin, and Sharp, 2002; Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier, 
2005b). Specifically, we construct the indices for the years 2003 to 2006, and we 
combine these with indices constructed in prior studies (Metcalfe ,2000; and Herath, 
Weersink, and Carpentier, 2005b), to complete the 1994-2006 time series for each of the 
top 10 hog producing states.25  
Because stringency indices used in prior studies are based on different measures 
and judgments, we make use of the method employed by Herath, Weersink, and 
Carpentier (2005b), to go around the problem of different stringency indices that exist in 
the literature. The methodology uses the ratio of the state value divided by the mean of 
the state’s regulation stringency for the period in the sample. If the value of this ratio is 
greater than 1, equals 1 and is less than 1, that state has above average, average and 
                                                 
25
 Environmental stringency indices based on Metcalfe (2000), Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005b), 
and those constructed in this study are documented in Table A-1 in Appendix A. The construction of the 
2003-2006 stringency indices is presented in Table A-2 in Appendix A. 
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below average stringency level, respectively.  This is one way to make the different 
stringency measures comparable.  
 Environmental stringency is endogenous in our model because regulations may 
increase in states that are experiencing increasing hog production while states with low 
environmental regulations may realize increased hog production (Metcalfe, 2001).  
Predicted values of the environmental stringency measure are used in order to take care 
of this endogeneity. A negative sign is expected on this variable as suggested by theory, 
0
*
<
∂
∂
Ew
y
, as it enters the hog production as an input. Specifically, in this model the 
indices reflect an environmental compliance cost. 
Spatial lag is used as a proxy for agglomeration economies. We use this variable 
in the same manner as in Roe, Irwin and Sharp (2002). A positive (negative) and 
statistically significant sign on the spatial lag variable suggests the presence (absence) of 
agglomeration economies in the hog industry. A positive or a negative sign is expected. 
3.4.1. Data  
The study uses data for 22 major U.S. hog producing states for the years 1994 through 
2006. We also estimate regressions for the Northern producing states, Southern hog 
producing states and the Midwest hog producing states. Results for the Northern, 
Southern and Midwest producing states are of interest in this study for three reasons.26 
First, regional spatial dependence is likely to be different from the spatial dependence we 
observe when all the 22 states are considered. Secondly, the Midwest-and Northern states 
account for most of the corn production in the U.S. and corn is a major input in hog 
                                                 
26
 It is important to note that the Midwest and Northern hog producing states are basically the same with the 
exception that Northern hog producing states include Pennsylvania.  
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production, and thirdly, the Midwest-and Northern states include eight of the top 10 U.S. 
hog producing states; Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, and Ohio. The top 10 U.S. hog producing states account for about 85% of total 
U.S. hog production. The states and regions considered in this study, data source and 
description, and the descriptive statistics are given in tables 14, 15, and 16, respectively. 
 
Table 14: Units of study 
Unit of study States 
22 major producing 
states 
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina ,Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin 
Midwest states 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South 
Dakota, and Wisconsin 
Northern states 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin 
Southern states 
 
Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky,  
North Carolina , Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, and Virginia 
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Table 15: Variable Definition and Data Sources 
Definition of variables  Source 
Hog farms total inventory  USDA-NASS 
Land value: Dollars/acre 
 NASS Agricultural Prices 
Summaries- USDA 
Hog price: Dollars/Cwt  
NASS Agricultural Prices 
Summaries- USDA  
Corn price: Dollars/Bushel  
NASS Agricultural Prices 
Summaries- USDA 
Transportation cost: cents per 
gallon:  
Energy Information 
Administration 
Environmental Stringency  
 1993-2002: Metcalfe(2000) and 
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier 
(2005) 
2003-2006 indices: author's 
estimates 
Farm labor: Dollars/Hour  Farm labor-NASS-USDA 
Cattle all beef price: Dollars/Cwt 
 NASS Agricultural Prices 
Summaries- USDA 
Income: personal per capita 
income/Dollars 
 Almanac of the 50 States 
Information Publications 
Population density(pd): persons 
per square mile  
 Almanac of the 50 States 
Information Publications 
Cwt refers to 100 weight 
 
 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Output% 4.40 5.84 0.07 27.68 
Hog price 42.13 8.72 27.47 83.51 
Corn price 2.43 0.56 1.5 4.38 
Transport  101.27 31.99 58.53 182.71 
Labor 7.88 0.80 6.16 9.96 
Land 1585.57 817.92 332.32 4185.42 
Population density 110.56 78.05 9.5 280.3 
Environmental stringency 1.00 0.52 0.2 2.38 
Cattle price 65.49 10.83 32.76 96.99 
Per capita income 27131.3 2981.53 20329.36 35334.31 
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3.5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Results for the 22 major hog producing states, Midwest hog producing states, Northern 
hog producing states, and Southern hog producing states are given in Tables 17, 18, 19 
and 20, respectively. 
Table 17: Results for the 22 major hog producing states 
 2 SLS -S LM GMM-SAR OLS 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio 
Constant -73.50 -6.44*** -93.83 -7.48*** -115.83 -9.51*** 
Index -58.50 -7.75*** -70.34 -8.86*** -86.77 -10.78*** 
Hog price 20.04 3.86*** 25.19 4.60*** 33.77 5.89*** 
Corn price -33.81 -6.68*** -39.86 -7.57*** -49.14 -8.88*** 
Transport  -1.66 -0.64 -3.20 -1.21 -8.00 -2.77*** 
Labor 31.47 4.08*** 47.99 5.53*** 64.21 7.97*** 
Land 7.23 6.43*** 8.18 6.82*** 9.22 7.30*** 
Agglom 0.57 10.41*** 
    
Rho 
  0.37 0.09   
Note for Table 17: The dependent variable is the state-level percentage share of total U.S. hog production.  P values are 
indicated as ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.10.  
 
Table 17 provides results for the 22 major hog producing states based on three 
different models, namely; 2SLS-SLM, GMM-SAR and OLS. The 2SLS-SLM results 
show that the coefficient of Agglom is positive and statistically significant while the 
coefficient of Rho is positive and statistically insignificant. Based on the GMM-SAR 
model results, we reject the null hypothesis that spatial autocorrelation through the error 
term exists at the state-level. Since there is evidence of positive spatial autocorrelation, 
the OLS model results are unbiased but inefficient (Anselin, 1988). We therefore 
conclude that the model that best explains our data is the 2SLS-SLM.  
Based on the 2SLS-SLM results, the coefficients on hog price, corn price, and 
transport have the expected signs. The coefficient on hog price suggests that hog 
production increased with an increase in the price of hogs. The coefficients on corn price 
and transport suggest that high prices of these factors of production serve to deter hog 
production in the 22 major hog producing states. The coefficients on labor and land have 
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unexpected positive and statistically significant signs. The coefficient on labor suggests 
that the presence of a large pool of labor or relatively low farm labor wages serve to 
attract hog production. The positive coefficient on land suggests that land values are 
favorable for hog production probably due to the availability of vast farming land.  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on Agglom suggests that 
production in a state is positively affected by hog production in a nearby state, 
confirming the existence of agglomeration economies in the U.S. hog industry. The 
coefficient on index is negative and statistically significant. This result suggests that 
environmental regulation has a negative effect on hog production.  
Table 18: Midwest hog producing states 
 2 SLS Spatial Lag GMM-SAR OLS 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio 
Constant -112.83 -6.22*** -104.35 -5.21*** -154.82 -8.67*** 
Index -116.10 -9.16*** -116.05 -9.16*** -149.46 -12.48*** 
Hog price 21.95 2.48*** 7.69 0.74 35.07 3.74*** 
Corn price -62.31 -8.69*** -63.27 -8.86*** -75.61 -10.23*** 
Transport  2.10 0.55 6.27 1.47 -0.79 -0.19 
Labor 62.38 5.33*** 71.34 5.41*** 87.27 7.42*** 
Land 10.96 6.51*** 12.86 6.37*** 12.75 6.98*** 
Agglom 0.35 5.03*** 
    
Rho 
  0.48 0.13   
Note for Table 18: The dependent variable is the state-level percentage share of total U.S. hog production.  P values are 
indicated as ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.10.  
 
Results for the Midwest hog producing states also show that the best model for 
the data is the 2SLS-SLM. Based on 2SLS-SLM results, hog production in a state is 
positively affected by hog production in a nearby state and environmental regulation has 
a negative effect on hog production. This result suggests that agglomeration economies 
are important for the Midwest hog producing states. The coefficients on hog price, and 
corn price have the expected signs, suggesting that hog price attracts hog production 
while the corn input cost deters hog production in the Midwest. The coefficient on 
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transport is positive and statistically insignificant. This result suggests that transport cost 
has no effect on hog production in the Midwest. The coefficients on land and labor have 
positive and statistically significant signs suggesting that the costs of these factors of 
production are favorable for hog production in the Midwest. The coefficient on index is 
negative and statistically significant. This result suggests that environmental regulations 
have a negative effect on hog production. 
Table 19: Northern hog producing states 
 2 SLS Spatial Lag GMM-SAR OLS 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio 
Constant -95.24 -6.21*** -105.20 -5.91*** -146.93 -8.49*** 
Index -86.27 -7.84*** -105.07 -9.37*** -137.83 -12.46*** 
Hog price 20.02 2.66 13.76 1.42 34.37 3.77*** 
Corn price -43.19 -6.87*** -51.52 -8.04*** -68.72 -10.22*** 
Transport  0.60 0.19 1.87 0.49 -2.28 -0.58 
Labor 51.66 5.53*** 68.67 6.73*** 80.77 7.54*** 
Land 8.13 5.27*** 11.57 6.01*** 12.78 7.18*** 
Agglom 0.52 7.92*** 
    
Rho 
  
0.45 0.12 
  
Note for table 19: The dependent variable is the state-level percentage share of total U.S. hog production.  P values are 
indicated as ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.10.  
 
The 2SLS-SLM is the best model for the regressions involving the Northern U.S. hog 
producing states. The coefficient on Agglom is positive and statistically significant 
confirming the presence of agglomeration economies in the Northern U.S. hog producing 
states. The coefficients on hog price, and corn price, have the expected negative signs. 
The coefficients on labor and land have unexpected positive signs and are statistically 
significant. The coefficient on transport is positive and statistically insignificant. The 
coefficient on index is negative and statistically significant. Results suggest that hog 
price, labor and land serve to attract hog production in the Northern U.S. hog producing 
states while corn price and environmental regulations (index) have negative effects on 
hog production for Northern U.S. hog producing states. 
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Table 20: Southern hog producing states 
 2 SLS Spatial Lag GMM-SAR OLS 
Variable Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio 
Constant -106.48 -4.88*** -77.61 -3.24*** -130.64 -5.35*** 
Index -112.30 -9.14*** -104.96 -8.26*** -136.32 -10.42*** 
Hog price 19.04 1.71 -1.33 -0.11 20.38 1.60 
Corn price -56.12 -8.09*** -51.97 -7.61*** -69.21 -9.33*** 
Transport  2.04 0.47 7.81 1.62 3.12 0.63 
Labor 57.30 4.72*** 55.56 4.15*** 75.48 5.66*** 
Land 11.81 5.86*** 12.70 4.96*** 14.83 6.70*** 
Agglom 0.37 5.34*** 
    
Rho 
 
  
0.54 
 
0.14 
   
Note for Table 20: The dependent variable is the state-level percentage share of total U.S. hog production.  P values are 
indicated as ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.10.  
 
The 2SLS-SLM is the best model for regressions involving the Southern U.S. hog 
producing states. The coefficient on Agglom is positive and statistically significant 
confirming the presence of agglomeration economies in the Southern U.S. hog producing 
states. Similar to the results for the Northern states, the coefficients on hog price, and 
corn price, have the expected negative signs. The coefficients on labor and land have 
unexpected positive signs and are statistically significant. The coefficient on transport is 
positive and statistically insignificant. The coefficient on index is negative and 
statistically significant and that environmental regulation has a negative effect on hog 
production. 
We established that the model that describes our data better for the 22 states, 
Midwest states, Northern states and Southern states is the 2SLS-SLM. We therefore 
document only the 2SLS-SLM results already reported in Tables 17-20.  These results are 
given in Table 21 below. 
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Table 21: 22 States and Regional 2SLS-SLM Results 
 All states Midwest North South 
Variable Coeff  T-ratio Coeff  T-ratio Coeff  T-ratio Coeff T-ratio 
Constant -73.50 -6.44*** -112.83 -6.22*** -95.24 -6.21*** -106.48 -4.88*** 
Index -58.50 -7.75*** -116.10 -9.16*** -86.27 -7.84*** -112.30 -9.14*** 
Hog price 20.04 3.86*** 21.95 2.48*** 20.02 2.66 19.04 1.71 
Corn price -33.81 -6.68*** -62.31 -8.69*** -43.19 -6.87*** -56.12 -8.09*** 
Transport  -1.66 -0.64 2.10 0.55 0.60 0.19 2.04 0.47 
Labor 31.47 4.08*** 62.38 5.33*** 51.66 5.53*** 57.30 4.72*** 
Land 7.23 6.43*** 10.96 6.51*** 8.13 5.27*** 11.81 5.86*** 
Agglom 0.57 10.41*** 0.35 5.03*** 0.52 7.92*** 0.37 5.34*** 
Note for Table 21: The dependent variable is the state-level percentage share of total U.S. hog production.  P values are 
indicated as ***0.01, **0.05 and *0.10.  
 
It is important to compare the regional variation of the results for the prime 
variables of interest. Results in Table 21 show that on average, regulation affects 
Midwest states the most, followed by the Southern states and the Northern states. On 
average, environmental regulation affects the 22 major hog producing states, the least. In 
a nutshell, results confirmed that regulation has a negative effect on U.S. hog production 
regardless of the region. 
With regard to agglomeration economies, results show that agglomeration 
economies are strongest for the 22 major hog producing states. Agglomeration economies 
for Northern hog producing states are greater than agglomeration economies for the 
Southern hog producing states.  The Southern hog producing states have greater 
agglomeration economies when compared to the Midwest hog producing states. This 
suggests that hog production in a state is more positively related to that of a neighboring 
state, when the 22 major producing states are considered.  However, results confirmed 
that agglomeration economies play a major role in U.S. hog production regardless of the 
region being considered.   
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Results on the effect of the cost of factors of production on the U.S. hog 
production industry suggest that: transport cost has no effect on hog production; land 
value and labor cost have a positive effect on hog production; and the cost of corn input 
has a negative effect on hog production for the 22 major hog producing states, Northern 
hog producing states, Southern hog producing states, and the Midwest hog producing 
states.  
3.6. Conclusions 
This study examined the importance of input availability, market attractiveness, 
agglomeration economies and state-level environmental regulations on 22 major U.S. hog 
producing states for the period 1994-2006. The 22 major U.S. hog producing states are 
further broken down into Midwest, North, and South U.S. regions. The theoretical model 
is based on a simple profit maximization model which treats the environment as an input 
in hog production. To come up with the empirical model that best explains our data, 
models based on Pooled OLS, 2SLS-SLM and GMM-SAR were estimated.  
The 2SLS-SLM results suggest that hog production in a state is positively affected 
by hog production in a nearby state over time. This result is true for the 22 major hog 
producing states, Northern hog producing states, Southern hog producing states and 
Midwest hog producing states. This result confirms the importance of agglomeration 
economies in the U.S. hog industry. This is a similar result to the county-level cross-
section result based on 1997 data found by Roe, Irwin, and Sharp (2002). However, this 
result contrasts with the result by Roe, Irwin, and Sharp (2002) on changes in regulation 
between the years1992-1997. Indeed, their result may have failed to capture the changes 
in regulation over time.  
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The GMM-SAR model results show that the error spatial parameter is statistically 
insignificant in all the GMM-SAR based models. Based on the GMM-SAR model results, 
we reject the null hypothesis that spatial autocorrelation through the error term exists at 
the state-level, confirming the conclusion by Roe, Irwin, and Sharp (2002).The presence 
of agglomeration economies present in the 2SLS-SLM  makes  the OLS results are 
unbiased but inefficient, Anselin (1988). We therefore conclude that the model that best 
explains our data is the 2SLS-SLM.   
The 2SLS-SLM results suggest that environmental regulations have a negative 
and statistically significant effect on U.S. hog production. This result holds for the 22 
major hog producing states, Northern hog producing states, Southern producing states 
and the Midwest hog producing states.  This confirms the robustness of this common 
result in studies that have addressed the effect of environmental regulations in the U.S. 
hog industry, Metcalfe (2001). This result suggests that tightening or increasing state-
level environmental regulations is one way to implement policies designed to reduce 
environmental pollution emanating from the hog production industry.  
An area for further investigation would be trying to answer the question: Is 
environmental regulation in a state influenced by regulation in nearby states? States may 
consider regulation in nearby state as a way to reduce the time cost of coming up with 
new regulations or to make their regulation more stringent than those of nearby states for 
political reasons. 
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Appendix A:  Understanding state-level Environmental Regulations on Hog Farms 
in the Top 10 Hog Producing States 
All the states in the U.S. are required to adopt the federal regulations passed in 1972. 
State governments for states which are highly dependent on animal production are trying 
to balance the environmental and economic implications of new regulations (Metcalfe, 
2000). The EPA authorizes the NPDES permits to state governments which allow the 
states to do most of the permitting, administrative and enforcement aspects of the NPDES 
program. According to Copeland (2008), currently 45 states have been authorized to 
administer the NPDES permit program and Oklahoma has been authorized to issue 
permits for most sources but not for CAFOs. Seven of the forty five states regulate 
CAFOs through the NPDES program only, thirty two states administer the NPDES 
program in addition they also require other state permits, licenses, or authorizations such 
as construction and operation permits, and six states regulate CAFOs under separate non-
NPDES programs.  
States which are not authorized to administer the NPDES program include 
Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and New Mexico. In 
these states the EPA retains the responsibility to issue CAFO permits. All the top 10 hog 
producing states are authorized to run the NPDES program by the EPA. Under the CWA, 
states are allowed to impose additional requirements for permits and freedom to regulate 
other types of operations not covered under the NPDES. In this section we will focus on 
the top 10 hog producing states in the U.S.  
A.1. Illinois 
The Illinois Department of Agriculture (IDA) administers the Livestock Management 
Facilities Act of 1996 that regulates the siting and construction of livestock production 
facilities across the state and includes requirements regarding facility setback distances, 
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facility design and construction standards, waste management plans, and livestock 
manager certification.  
To construct a livestock management facility or a livestock waste handling facility, 
the owner has to notify the IDA prior to construction. This is required in order to 
determine setbacks in compliance with setback distances and other location requirements. 
Livestock waste handling facilities other than earthen livestock waste lagoons are 
required to meet certain design standards to ensure that they are strong and the load they 
are capable of handling and that they are compatible with their intended use. The state 
regulates the siting of animal waste disposal facilities. New livestock management 
facilities and livestock waste handling facilities constructed after January 1, 2001 shall be 
subject to the additional construction requirements and siting prohibitions. These include: 
i. No new non-lagoon livestock management facility or livestock waste handling 
facility may be constructed within the floodway of a 100-year floodplain. 
ii. A new non-lagoon livestock waste handling facility constructed in a karst27 area shall 
be designed to prevent seepage of the stored material into groundwater 
iii. A new non-lagoon livestock waste handling facility constructed in an area where 
aquifer material is present within 5 feet of the bottom of the facility shall be designed 
                                                 
27
 Karst means an area with a land surface containing sinkholes, large springs, disrupted 
land drainage, and underground drainage systems associated with karstified carbonate 
bedrock and caves or a land surface without these features but containing a karstified 
carbonate bedrock unit generally overlain by less than 60 feet of unconsolidated 
materials. Karstified Carbonate Bedrock” means a carbonate bedrock unit (limestone or 
dolomite) that has a pronounced conduit or secondary porosity due to dissolution of the 
rock along joints, fractures, or bedding plains. 
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to ensure the structural integrity of the containment structure and to prevent seepage 
of the stored material to groundwater. 
An owner or operator of a livestock waste handling facility should report to the 
Agency any release of livestock waste from a livestock waste handling facility or from 
the transport of livestock waste within 24 hours after discovery of the release. Reporting 
is not required in the case of a release of less than 25 gallons that is not released to the 
waters of the State or from a controlled and recovered release during field application. 
Failure to report is subject to a fine which gets larger as the number of failing to report 
violations increase. 
The livestock management facility owner or operator has to comply with the 
requirements for handling, storing, and disposing of livestock wastes as set by the Illinois 
Environmental Protection Act concerning agriculture related pollution. The livestock 
management facility owner or operator of a facility of 1,000 or greater animal units but 
less than 5,000 animal units shall prepare and maintain a general waste management plan 
file at the livestock management facility. An operator of a facility with 5000 animal units 
and above has to have his/her waste management plan approved by the IDA before 
operation of the facility. Owners of livestock facilities are required to upgrade their 
facilities as the number of animal units change over time and also incorporate the 
requirements of the regulations that govern them.  
The IDA inspects the construction site prior to construction, during construction, 
and within 10 business days following receipt of the certification of compliance. The 
person making any inspection shall comply with reasonable animal health protection 
procedures as requested by the owner, operator, or certified livestock manager. The IDA 
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will seek an injunction in circuit court to prohibit the operation of the facility until 
construction and certification of the livestock waste handling facility are in compliance 
with the rules if in any case the owner violates any agreement of compliance. The IDA 
also regulates odor from animal feeding operations. Operators of livestock waste 
handling facilities are required to practice odor control methods during the course of 
manure removal and field application in accordance with the rules set by the Illinois 
Environmental Protection Act concerning agriculture related pollution. 
The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) uses permit programs as 
one of the tools to regulate wastewater discharges to Illinois streams and lakes. Within 
the permit programs, facility owners and the public are provided with a discharge specific 
interpretation of the law and regulations. A specific set of effluent limits, a monitoring 
schedule, a reporting schedule and an approval of the treatment systems about to be built 
are also provided through the permit program. Two separate permit programs are 
administered by the Bureau of water which are, the NPDES permit program and the state 
construction/operating permit program. The NPDES permit program is ran the same way 
as discussed earlier. The program requires permits for the discharge of treated municipal 
effluent, treated industrial effluent and storm water. The conditions under which the 
discharge may occur and establish monitoring and reporting requirements are established 
within this permit program. The state of Illinois received its delegation to administer this 
federal permit program on October, 23, 1977.  The state construction/operating permit 
program is based in the state Environmental Protection Act and the regulations developed 
by the Pollution Control Board. 
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A.2. Indiana 
Indiana law defines a confined feeding operation (CFO) as any animal feeding operation 
engaged in the confined feeding of at least 300 cattle, or 600 swine or sheep, or 30,000 
fowl, such as chickens, turkeys or other poultry. The Indiana Department of 
Environmental Management (IDEM) regulates confined feeding operations, as well as 
smaller operations which have violated water pollution rules or laws that govern confined 
feeding operations. 
 It is believed that confined feeding operations are more than likely to pose environmental 
concerns, including the following: 
i. Manure can leak or spill from storage pits, lagoons or tanks  
ii. Improper application of manure to the land can impair surface or ground water 
quality 
The IDEM CAFO approval/permit program is based on the Confined Feeding Control 
Law administered through regulations adopted under the Water Pollution Control Board. 
The goal of these regulations is to protect water quality. Through this regulation program 
the IDEM ensure that waste storage structures are designed, constructed and maintained 
to be structurally sound and in addition that manure is handled and land applied in an 
environmentally acceptable manner. The IDEM permits the construction of new confined 
feeding operations, expansions of existing confined feeding operations, and existing 
animal feeding operations that must seek approval due to water quality violations. The 
IDEM administers the NPDES permit program required by the CWA. In December 2003, 
EPA released a final regulation for CAFOs. Farms of feeding facilities that are defined as 
point sources by the CWA and are required to obtain permit coverage. Any hog feeding 
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operation that has 1000 animal unit capacity (2500 swine above 55 pounds) will need a 
NDPES permit. 
A.3. Iowa 
In Iowa, EPA delegates enforcement of the NPDES program to the Iowa Department of 
Natural Resources (DNR). Livestock and poultry producers need to follow state law and 
state regulations. The DNR issues the federal NPDES permits. Open feedlots that are 
greater than 1,000 animal units need to apply for the NPDES permits. Confinement 
feeding operations have not needed NPDES permits under federal law however the 2002 
changes in federal rules meant that all confinement feeding operations with more than 
1,000 animal units will be affected by the NPDES permitting requirements. The state of 
Iowa regulates two types of AFOs, namely; confined feeding operations and open 
feedlots. A confinement feeding operation confines animals to areas that are totally 
roofed. Confinement feeding operations in Iowa are not allowed to discharge manure to a 
water of the state. An open feedlot is unroofed or partially roofed with no vegetation or 
residue ground cover while the animals are confined. Hog operations are associated with 
confinement feeding operations in Iowa. 
Confinement operations 
Confinement feeding operations that plan to build, modify or expand must meet state 
requirements for the new construction. The size of the manure storage system needs to be 
determined based on the size of the proposed facility.  The size of the proposed unit will 
be determined by calculating the animal unit capacity (ACU). The state of Iowa 
distinguishes between formed and unformed manure storage facilities. Formed manure 
storage structures usually have concrete or steel walls and floors and unformed manure 
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storage structures or earthen basins include anaerobic lagoons, earthen aerobic structures 
and earthen manure storage basins. A construction permit is required prior to building, 
modifying or expanding all sizes of operations that use unformed storage. A construction 
permit will also be required prior to building, modifying, or expanding any operation that 
uses formed storage if the final animal unit capacity will be 1,000 animal units or more.  
The state of Iowa does not permit the construction permit is not required for building, 
modifying or expanding a confinement feeding operation with a proposed animal unit 
capacity from 501 to 999 animal units that uses formed storage. Pre-construction and 
design standards will still have to be met before construction begins. 
Manure management plans 
This applies to all animal feeding operations regardless of the size of the operation in 
Iowa. Iowa law requires that all manure from an animal feeding operation be disposed so 
that it does not cause surface or groundwater pollution 
Separation distances 
The state of Iowa also requires some separation distances to be maintained between areas 
of land application, protected buildings, sinkholes, wells, agricultural drainage wells, 
water sources, high quality water source and from public buildings. High quality water 
source include high quality water (HQ), high quality resource water (HQR) and protected 
water sources (PWS). High quality water is waters with exceptionally better quality than 
the levels specified in the Water Quality Standards and with exceptional recreational and 
ecological importance. High quality resource water are waters of substantial recreational 
or ecological significance which possess unusual, outstanding or unique physical, 
chemical, or biological characteristics which enhance the beneficial uses and warrant 
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special protection. A protected water source is a program designed to maintain, preserve 
and protect outstanding natural and scenic qualities of select waters and their adjacent 
land areas. 
i. Manure disposal is generally prohibited; 
o  Within 200 feet of a well, agricultural drainage well, cistern, surface 
water inlet or water source including lakes, rivers, streams, ditches, etc. 
unless:  
 The manure is injected or is incorporated in the soil on the same 
date of application, or  
 Permanent vegetation covers the area within 50 feet of the 
designated area, and no manure is applied within the 50-foot area.  
o Within 800 feet of a high quality water resource unless: 
 The manure is injected or is incorporated in the soil on the same 
date of application, or  
 Permanent vegetation covers the area within 50 feet of the 
designated area, and no manure is applied within the 50-foot area.  
ii. Regulations that apply only for confinement feeding operations include; 
iii. Manure shall not be discharged directly into a water of the state or into a tile line 
that discharges directly to state waters.  
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iv. Operations using anaerobic lagoons or other earthen manure storage structures 
must maintain a minimum of two feet of "freeboard" at all times. In other words, 
the liquid level in the structure must never get within two feet of overflowing.  
v. Upon closing a confinement feeding operation, the owner must remove and 
properly dispose of all accumulated manure from the operation's manure storage 
structures.  
Tables 22-24 below summarize manure application setbacks in Iowa. 
Table 22: Required separation distances (in feet) to buildings or public use areas by type of manure 
and method of manure application 
 
Source: Iowa Department of Natural Resources 2003 revisions 
Table 23: Required separation distances (in feet) to designated areas by type of manure and method 
of manure application 
 
Source: Iowa Department of Natural Resources 2003 revisions 
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Table 24: Required separation distances (in feet) for land application of irrigated liquid manure 
 
Source: Iowa Department of Natural Resources 2003 revisions 
 
Land application of manure 
i. Confinement feeding operations larger than a small animal feeding operation with 
500 animal units or less must:  
o Use a certified manure applicator to apply manure, and  
o Apply manure at or below the nitrogen use level necessary to obtain 
optimum crop yields, and  
o Submit a manure management plan to the Iowa Department of Natural 
Resources(DNR) each year, and  
o Keep records of manure application  
ii. Land application of manure for all confinement feeding operations 
iii. Using spray irrigation for manure disposal is allowed under state statutes, 
provided the irrigation operations comply with separation distance and other 
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disposal requirements of DNR rules. However, spray irrigation of manure is not 
allowed on land located within the drainage area of an agricultural drainage well.  
iv. Liquid manure disposal from a confinement is also prohibited within 750 feet of 
certain buildings and public use areas.  
A.4. Kansas 
Kansas is the only state in the top 10 hog producing a state that is authorized by the EPA 
to shut down operations that violate water quality standards. In 1998, the Kansas 
legislature came up with additional regulations on swine operations. The Environmental 
Quality Council (EQC) Water Policy Subcommittee summarized the main elements of 
this law as follows; 
i. Setbacks for confined feeding facilities for swine with 300 or more Animal Units 
from: existing habitable structures; city, county, state, or federal parks; and 
wildlife refuges. Setback requirements do not apply to new habitable structures or 
parks. 
ii. Notice and publication requirements. 
iii. Setbacks from water sources. 
iv. Manure management plans required. Soil testing required when manure is land 
applied. 
v. Nutrient utilization plans required if the manure or wastewater will be land 
applied. Land application of manure or waste water other than by incorporation 
into the soil during the same day is prohibited within 1,000 feet of: any habitable 
structure; city, county, state or federal park; or wildlife refuge. The law provides 
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for exceptions to this provision. Requirements are established for use of an 
irrigation system to apply manure or wastewater from such facilities. 
vi. Operator certification. 
vii. Odor control plans required for facilities. 
viii. Closure requirements including: a closure plan and financial assurance for closure 
costs is required for facilities with more than 3,725 Animal Units; closure 
requirements to be established by Kansas Department of Health and Environment 
(KDHE) for swine retention lagoons or ponds. 
ix. Periodic inspection of swine facilities is required. 
x. A liner is required for waste retention lagoons or ponds at swine facilities with an 
animal unit capacity of 3,725 or more. 
xi. The KDHE may require the installation of groundwater monitoring wells and may 
require sampling. 
xii. The KDHE may require vegetative screening (planting trees) to control odor. 
xiii. The KDHE may adopt requirements governing location and construction of waste 
retention lagoons and ponds to protect the state's waters and soils. 
xiv. Plans are required for handling of dead swine. The KDHE is authorized to adopt 
rules and regulations for handling of dead swine. 
xv. Kansas State University is required to cooperate with KDHE, other agencies and 
owners and operators of swine facilities to determine best available technology 
and best management practices. 
xvi. KDHE is authorized to establish more stringent requirements. 
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A.5. Minnesota 
Currently, the State of Minnesota only regulates Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) and Particulate 
Matter (PM) emissions from livestock operations. H2S is regulated through the state H2S 
ambient air standard. This standard is a 30-minute average of 30 parts per billion (ppb) 
found twice in five days, or a 30-minute average of 50 ppb found twice per year. Odor is 
not regulated by the State at the present time. The MPCA is responsible for enforcing 
H2S and PM. The MPCA utilizes a hand held unit called a Jerome Meter to screen for 
H2S. Jerome meters cannot be used to establish a legal violation of the standard; this 
requires continuous air monitoring. When H2S emissions are exceeded, the MPCA may 
utilize a Continuous Air Monitor (CAM) to further monitor H2S emissions in the field for 
an extended period of time. It should be noted that a variety of factors can affect the 
accuracy of CAM results. Livestock operators that are emptying liquid manure storage 
areas and are applying the manure are exempt from H2S standards for 21 days during a 
calendar year. More information is posted on the 
The state of Minnesota also regulates the design, construction, operation and 
maintenance of liquid manure storage. Owners must submit their engineered plans and 
specifications to the MPCA or delegated county feedlot officer. MPCA regulates the 
collection, transportation, storage, processing and disposal of animal manure and 
livestock processing activities, and provides assistance to counties and the livestock 
industry. The rules apply to all aspects of livestock production areas including the 
location, design, construction, operation and management of feedlots, feed storage, storm 
water runoff, and manure handling facilities. New or modified liquid manure storage area 
with 1,000 or more animal units must be designed to provide a minimum of nine months 
storage capacity. New Feedlots are prohibited in, flood plains, within 300 feet of a sink 
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hole, within 100 feet of a private well and within 1000 feet of a community water supply 
well or wells serving a school or licensed childcare center. 
Regulations through the permit system 
For owners with 300 animal units or more, and less than 1,000 animal units, a 
streamlined short-form construction permit is required for construction activities. A 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit or State Disposal 
System (SDS) permit is required for all feedlots with 1,000 animal units or more, or that 
are defined as a CAFO under the federal rule. Permits are not required for feedlots with 
less than 300 animal units and if the facility is located in county fairgrounds.  
A description of the permits required by the state of Minnesota is as follows: 
i. Five year permits are required for the construction and/or operation of an animal 
feedlot that has 1000 or more animal units, or is otherwise a CAFO as defined 
under federal regulations Title 40 section 122.23 that meets the criteria for a 
General NPDES/SDS permit. Such permits will last 5 years and will need to be 
renewed.  
ii. Five year permits are also required for individual SDS if they own/operate a 
facility that has 1000 or more animal units that do not meet the criteria of a 
CAFO.  
iii. Twenty four month interim permits are required for owners of facilities with less 
than 1,000 animal units and non-CAFOs that have an identified pollution hazard. 
For owners of facilities with more than 300 animal units where land application is 
on high phosphorus soils; on greater than 6 percent slopes in special protection 
areas; or in a drinking-water supply management area where the aquifer is 
125 
 
vulnerable. Interim permits can be issued for any size facility under 1,000 animal 
units.  
iv. Construction short-form permits are required for facilities proposing to construct 
or expand in the range of 300 to 999 animal units that do not have pollution 
hazards. 
v. Prior to construction or expansion, the owner must obtain the proper permit or 
permit modification. Owners constructing or expanding must complete all 
notifications and may commence construction/expansion 30 days after notifying 
the MPCA and/or delegated county and all local zoning authorities. Liquid 
manure storage plans and specifications must be submitted with a permit 
application or at least 90 days before the planned start date of 
construction/expansion.  
vi. If an owner with a pollution hazard was issued an interim permit that also 
authorizes construction for an expansion, the owner cannot stock the expansion 
until the pollution hazard is corrected. 
A.6. Missouri 
The Missouri Department of Natural Resources (MDN) is responsible for 
publishing rules and enforcing standards regarding animal waste in Missouri.  The rules 
and regulations are designed to protect water from getting contaminated by animal waste. 
Animal feeding operations are classified according to the number of animal units at each 
location.  Table 25 documents the Missouri AFO classification for swine. 
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Table 25: Swine AFO classifications 
Class  Animal unit equivalence 
for swine weighing more 
than 55pounds 
Animal unit equivalence 
for swine weighing less 
than 55pounds 
Permit requirement 
Class 1A(7000 AUs) 17500 105 000 Required  
Class 1B(3000-6999 AUs) 7500 to 17 499 45000 to 104999 Required  
Class 1C(1000-2999 AUs) 2500 to 7499 15000 to 104999 Required  
Class II(300-999 AUs) 750 to 2499 4500 to 14999 Usually not required 
Source: Missouri Department of Natural Resources guide to animal feeding operations February, 2008. 
 
The MDNR permits the construction of new hog facilities and these have to meet the 
buffer distances between the hog facility and public buildings or occupied residences. 
Classes 1A, 1B and 1C CAFOs should satisfy 3000 feet, 2000 feet and 1000 feet buffer 
distances respectively. A site specific permit is required for Class 1A CAFOs and Classes 
1B and 1C each require a general permit. Critical watershed requirements only apply to 
Class 1A CAFOs. New and expanding Class 1A CAFOs must submit a spill prevention 
plan for approval by the MDNR with the permit application. Class 1A CAFOs are 
prohibited in watersheds of the Current, Eleven Point and Jacks Forth rivers. When 
planning changes or expanding an animal feeding operation, permitted producers must 
consider the location of wells in relation to animal production, land application, waste 
storage, composter site or other potential water contamination sources.  The Missouri 
Clean Water commission set the minimum separation distances affecting CAFOs.  
Animal waste should be land applied as a plant nutrient and should always be managed 
so runoff does not occur. The application separation distances range from as low as 50 
feet from property lines to 300 feet from losing streams, sinkholes, caves, wells, 
abandoned wells, water supply structures or impoundments and any other connection 
127 
 
between surface and groundwater. The MDN requires that AFOs be located above the 25 
year flood level and that minimum design and construction requirements are met. 
Construction and operating permits are also required for all Class 1 CAFOs and for any 
Class II CAFO that will discharge through a man-made conveyance. Land disturbance 
permits are required for storm water discharges from Class I CAFOs if the area to be 
disturbed will total one acre or more for the entire project. This permit must be obtained 
prior to any land clearing or grading. This permit requires the installation of best 
management practices to limit soil erosion and sediment movement during construction 
activities. 
A.7. Nebraska 
Nebraska’s livestock AFO regulations which also apply to hog farming are as follows; 
i. The state of Nebraska permits the construction and operation of new livestock 
facilities. For a large concentrated animal feeding operation, a plan describing 
best management practices to minimize odors from the animal feeding operation, 
the facility, and the disposal of livestock waste 
ii. The owner or operator of a concentrated animal feeding operation which 
discharges or intends to discharge shall apply for an individual NPDES permit or 
submit a request for coverage under a general NPDES permit. The permittee is 
required to submit an application to renew an individual NPDES permit or submit 
a request for coverage under a NPDES general permit no later than 180 days 
before the expiration of the permit unless permission for submittal at a later date 
has been granted by the Director. If the permittee fails to renew the permit, the 
feeding operation will be permanently ceased. 
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iii. There are effluent limitations for concentrated animal feeding operations. For 
existing large beef, dairy, horse, sheep, swine, poultry, and veal calf concentrated 
animal feeding operations and new large beef, dairy, horse, and sheep 
concentrated animal feeding operations, there shall be no discharge of manure, 
litter, or process wastewater pollutants into waters of the state from the production 
area except that when precipitation causes an overflow of manure, litter, or 
process wastewater. There has to be proof that the production facility was well 
constructed to contain all manure and that it operated in accordance with 
regulations. 
iv. Livestock waste control facilities shall be designed and constructed to allow 
application or utilization of livestock wastes at those times compatible with crop 
management and available waste handling equipment. Factors to account for 
include, but are not limited to, the maximum length of time anticipated between 
emptying events, the frequency of emptying events or dewatering, the hydraulic 
limitations of the land application areas, the nutrient content and concentration in 
the storage structure, and the appropriate timing of application as specified in the 
applicable technical standards for nutrient management. 
v. A livestock waste control facility shall not be constructed: 
o Within 100 feet of any well used for domestic purposes. For the purposes 
of these regulations, domestic water well means a water well providing 
water to any water supply system furnishing water for human consumption 
other than a public water supply system; for the watering of livestock, 
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poultry, farm, and domestic animals; or for the irrigation of lands not 
exceeding an area of two acres; 
o Within 1000 feet of a public drinking water supply well, unless the 
applicant furnishes the Department with field-derived data giving 
estimates of the depth, velocity and flow direction of ground water which 
support the contention that the facility will not result in ground water 
contamination and after review, the Department concurs; 
o In an area or in such a manner that, in the Department's judgment, there is 
a substantial threat of beneficial use impairment to surface waters of the 
State;  
o Where the Department determines that ground water may be 
contaminated; or 
o Less than four feet above the seasonal high ground water level. Except, 
that a facility for an existing animal feeding operation may, with 
Department approval, be located less than four feet above the seasonal 
high ground water level, if the design provides for structural stability, a 
maximum operating depth of six feet, and provisions are made to maintain 
the facility. In addition, for a facility located at or below the seasonal high 
ground water level a low permeability liner with saturated hydraulic 
conductivity of 1x10-7 cm/sec., or less, and at least one foot in thickness or 
equivalent shall be utilized. No new animal feeding operation shall be 
issued a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit or a 
construction and operating permit in any part of a watershed that feeds 
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directly or indirectly into a cold water class A stream. An existing animal 
feeding operation may not expand if its livestock waste control facility is 
located within one mile of a designated cold water class A stream 
segment. For large concentrated animal feeding operations, manure, litter, 
and process wastewater may not be stockpiled or applied closer than 100 
feet to any down-gradient surface waters, open tile line intake structures, 
well heads, or other conduits to surface or ground water 
vi. Best management practices are required to be exercised by livestock facilities in 
their operation and maintenance. Best management practices shall be 
implemented using the most effective methods based on the best available 
technology achievable for specific sites to prevent or reduce the discharge of 
pollutants to waters of the State and control odor where appropriate. 
vii. The NPDES permit holder or the owner or operator of a large concentrated animal 
feeding operation with a livestock waste control facility is required to have 
routine inspections conducted of the production area, irrigation distribution 
system, and land application areas.  
viii. Ground water monitoring may be required for any large concentrated animal 
feeding operation based on a site-specific review by the Department. 
ix. According to Aiken (2002), livestock facilities are subject to state environmental 
regulation by the Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality, and to local 
zoning regulations if the county is zoned. By 1999 a total of eighty nine counties 
where pursuing zoning regulations. County zoning regulations are implemented 
through a zoning permit process. The common reason for county zoning 
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regulations is to protect existing agricultural land uses. The other reason for 
zoning of counties was implemented in order to regulate the size and location of 
livestock facilities such as hog facilities. There is great fear in the state that 
livestock zoning would reduce the expansion of the livestock industry.  
A.8. North Carolina 
North Carolina is one of the major hog producers in the country. Major laws related to 
hog farming in this state include as of 2002 include;  
i. The swine farm citing act of 1995 law became effective October 1, 1995. It 
imposed mandatory statewide requirements on all new or expanded factory hog 
farms, raising 250 or more hogs. It required that hog houses and waste lagoons be 
at least 1500 feet, 2500 feet and 100 feet from any occupied residence, from any 
school, hospital, or church and from any property boundary respectively. This law 
also required that waste application (spray fields) be at least 50 feet from both any 
residential property boundary and any perennial stream or river. 
ii. The 1996 Act to implement recommendations on the Blue Ribbon study 
commission on agricultural waste imposed a law with new requirements relating 
to permitting, oversight, siting, public notice, and enforcement for factory hog, 
poultry and other livestock operations. This law directed the state to develop a 
system of general "nondischarge permits" for animal operations above certain size 
thresholds. Factory hog farms with 250 or more hogs were required to obtain a 
general permit--starting in 1997, the state has five years to phase in the general 
permits for all affected hog and other livestock operations. It also included 
requirements through the permit system to obtain a livestock waste management 
plan 
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iii. The 1997 clean water responsibility and environmentally sound policy Act 
created a law which imposed a partial moratorium on new and expanded factory 
hog farms, directed the state to develop a plan to phase out anaerobic waste 
lagoons and sprayfields, and imposed additional requirements.  
iv. Moratorium: The law imposed a moratorium on the construction of new and 
expanded hog operations with 250 or more hogs until March 1, 1999. The purpose 
of the moratorium was to give counties time to adopt zoning ordinances and to 
allow research on environmental impacts and alternative waste technologies to be 
completed.  
v. Zoning: The law restored partial zoning authority to counties. This authorizes 
counties to adopt zoning regulations for hog farms with a design capacity of at 
least 600,000 steady state live weight (or approximately 4,500 hogs).  
vi. Phase-out Plan: The law directed the state Department of Agriculture to develop, 
by May 1, 1998, a "plan to phase out the use of anaerobic lagoons and sprayfields 
as primary methods of disposing of animal waste at swine farms."  
Additional Setbacks for Hog Houses and Lagoons: The law required setbacks 
from hog houses and lagoons to be at least 2,500 feet from any outdoor recreational 
facility, national park, state park, historic property, or child care center; at least 500 feet 
from any well supplying water to a public water system; at least 500 feet from any other 
well supplying water for human consumption.  Additional Setbacks for Application of 
Waste (Sprayfields): increased the setback from 50 feet to at least 75 feet from any 
residential property line and from any perennial stream or river. (See Chapter 106, Article 
67 of the North Carolina General Statutes.)  
133 
 
An Act to provide for the registration of swine farms associated with swine 
operation integrators and to extend the 1997 moratorium was passed in 1998. The law 
extended the moratorium on new and expanded factory hog farms by six months until 
September, 1, 1999.  In addition it required contract hog growers to provide information 
to the state regarding the swine operation integrator with whom that farmer is contracted 
with. This law further requires the state to notify integrators of any violations at contract 
farms. 
A.9. Ohio 
The Ohio Department of Agriculture’s Livestock Environmental Permitting Program 
permits, inspects and regulates the Large Concentrated Animal Feeding Facilities (CAFF) 
in the state with the issuance of Permission to Install (PTI) permits for installation and 5 
year renewable Permission to Operate (PTO) permits for Operation. The state of Ohio 
also has an authorization request package into U.S. EPA for transfer of the federal 
NPDES permitting from Ohio EPA to Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA).  Large 
CAFF’s for hogs are those facilities with more than 2500 hogs over 55 pounds.  
Small and medium facilities are not permitted unless they discharge to waters of 
the state or have been referred to us by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources-
Division of Soil and Water Conservation. The Division of Soil and Water Conservation 
and the 88 Soil and Water Conservation Districts have regulatory authority, including 
penalties and referral for permitting. CAFO permits include requirements that have to do 
with production and land application areas. These include prohibition on discharges and a 
requirement to develop and implement a manure management plan. Discharges of 
manure, litter and waste water are not allowed. Discharges are only allowed in 
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accordance with the federal regulation exemptions cited earlier. For land application area, 
the permit prohibits discharges from manure stockpiles, discharges during land 
application, and discharges from land applied manure unless a manure management plan 
was implemented. The ODA requires a manure management plan and results pertaining 
to the discharge, manure and soil sampling. A manure management plan should include a 
land application plan to comply with the land application requirements of the permit and 
should include; a total nutrient budget, manure and soil characteristics, application 
methods and specific agronomic application rates. Manure storage facilities are subject to 
inspection by the ODA. A summary of the Ohio manure application setback restrictions 
is provided in Table 26 below. 
Table 26: Summary of Ohio manure application setbacks 
 
Source: Livestock Environmental Assurance Program 2003 Fact Sheet 
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A.10. Oklahoma 
The state of Oklahoma passed the Swine Feeding Operations Act which was made 
effective in November of 2007. Oklahoma State also enforces the AFO regulation, 
NDPES through the Swine Feeding Operations Act.  The purpose of the Oklahoma Swine 
Feeding Operations Act is to provide for environmentally responsible construction and 
expansion of swine feeding operations and to protect the safety, welfare and quality of 
life of persons who live in the vicinity of a swine feeding operation. Any swine feeding 
operation meeting the criteria defining a concentrated swine feeding operation is required 
to obtain a license to operate.  A concentrated swine feeding operation in Oklahoma can 
be defined as a licensed managed feeding operation. Any swine feeding operation may be 
designated as a concentrated swine feeding operation if it is determined to be a significant 
contributor of pollution to the waters of the state. Among the characteristics defining a 
concentrated swine feeding operation are; the size of the operation, location of the 
operation relative to state waters, method of swine waste disposal and process wastewater 
disposal, and land and vegetation characteristics.  
Non concentrated swine feeding operations can only be regulated under the Swine 
Feeding Operations Act if the State Board of Agriculture has enough proof that the 
operation is a significant contributor of pollution to state waters. If a single owner 
operates two or more facilities, the facilities are considered as a single facility for the 
purposes of licensing if they are close to each other if they use a common waste disposal 
facility. 
The state permits the construction of a new facility or the expansion of an existing 
facility if such a facility falls under licensed facilities. In order to expand an operation, 
the owner has to seek modification to the old license prior to expansion. Licensed swine 
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feeding operators are required to develop a Pollution Prevention Plan which will have to 
be approved by the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Food, and Forestry (ODAFF). 
Modifications to the plan are required if ever the owner expands the operation. The state 
also requires all operations to utilize Best Management Practices in line with the rules set 
by the State Board of Agriculture which satisfy the Swine Feeding Operations Act. The 
licensee is required to report any discharge exceeding 100 gallons of wastewater to the 
waters of the state.  
A waste management plan documenting swine waste removal procedures and records 
of inspections of retention structures is also required. The disposal of dead swine has to 
meet the standards set by the ODAFF. All licensed swine feeding operations are required 
to develop an Odor Abatement Plan prior to the submission of an application. The Odor 
Abatement Plan should address methods for reducing odors in relationship to swine 
maintenance, waste storage, land application, and carcass disposal. The ODAFF reviews 
and approves Odor Abatement Plans. Factors which the OADFF uses when deciding 
whether to approve an Odor Abatement Plan include; design of the facilities, odor control 
technology to be utilized, prevailing wind direction in relation to occupied residences, 
size of operation, and distance from facility to occupied residences. Setback requirements 
for concentrated swine feeding operations include the following: 
i. Liquid swine waste cannot be land applied within five hundred (500) feet of the 
nearest corner of an occupied residence not owned or leased by the owner of the 
swine feeding operation. 
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ii. Concentrated swine feeding operation cannot be established within one (1) mile 
of ten or more residences that are occupied residences at the time of the 
establishment of the operation. 
iii. Liquid swine waste cannot be land applied within three hundred (300) feet of an 
existing public or private drinking water well. 
iv. Concentrated swine feeding operation cannot be established if located: 
o Within three (3) miles of a state park or resort. 
o On land within three (3) miles of the incorporated limits of any 
municipality. 
o Within three (3) miles of the high water mark of a surface public water 
supply if the concentrated swine feeding operation is located within the 
drainage basin for the public water supply. 
v. All distances between occupied residences and swine feeding operations will be 
measured from the closest corner of the walls of the occupied residence to the 
closest point of the nearest waste facility, as determined by the OADFF. 
vi. Any violations to the requirements of the Swine Feeding Operations Act will be 
punished by a penalty. The size of the penalties is documented in the Swine 
Feeding Operations Act. 
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Appendix B: State-level Environmental Indices 
 
Table 27: State-level environmental indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note for Table 27: 1994 and 1998 indices were constructed by Metcalfe (2000), 2000 index constructed in 
Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005) and 2003 index constructed by the author. Indices with 
superscript HWC are Herath, Weersink, and Carpentier (2005)’s approximations of Metcalfe (2000)’s 
indices for the states that were not considered in the construction of the 1994 and 1998 indices in Metcalfe 
(2000) 
 
Table 28 below shows how we constructed our current, 2003-2006, following Metcalfe 
(2000)’s methodology and our estimates are shown below. We make use of the 
regulations required of all operations by the federal government (FED): waste 
management plans (WMPs), mandatory record keeping (MRK), odor abatement plans 
State 
1994 
Metcalfe 
1998 
Metcalfe 
2000 
Herath, 
Weersink 
and 
Carpentier 
2003 
Author’s 
estimates 
Arkansas 3.63HWC 7.16  HWC 4.46 13 
Colorado 3.63 HWC 7.16 HWC 6.99 13 
Georgia 6 9 5.24 11 
Illinois 2 8 4 14 
Indiana 4 6 2.62 13 
Iowa 4 9 3.25 13 
Kansas 4 9 4.71 13 
Kentucky 2 7 2.66 13 
Michigan 1 3 2 11 
Minnesota 8 9 5.35 13 
Missouri 6 7 3.83 12 
Nebraska 3 7 5.2 12 
North Carolina 1 8 4.98 14 
Ohio 5 7 3.63 12 
Oklahoma 4 6 4.73 13 
Pennsylvania 2 7 3.08 11 
South Dakota 2 8 2.11 12 
Tennessee 3.63 HWC 7.16 HWC 2 11 
Texas 3.63 HWC 7.16 HWC 2.09 13 
Utah 3.63 HWC 7.16 HWC 2 11 
Virginia 3 5 1.06 11 
Wisconsin 3.63 HWC 7.16 HWC 4 12 
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(OAPs), handling of dead swine (HDS), reports on waste spillage (RWS), nutrient 
management plans (NMPs), manure (dry and liquid) application setbacks (MAPs), cost 
share programs (CSPs) and AFO location setbacks(ALSB). In addition, all of the 22 hog 
producing states enforce: facility design approval (FDA); and construction and operation 
permits (COPs). However, variation in regulation exists within these ten states. Some 
states regulate hydrogen sulfide (HSR). While the federal location setback requirement 
(ALSB) is 1000 feet, the individual state requirements range from 1875 feet (IA) to three 
miles (OK). The federal government requires a manure application (MAP) setback of 100 
feet to 300 feet for MAPs, while state-required setbacks range from 500 feet (IN and OK) 
to 3960 feet. 
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Table 28: Construction of the 2003-2006 State-level Environmental Stringency Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 28 compares the stringency of regulations of HFOs at the state-level. A ‘0’ indicates that the type of 
regulation is not used at the state level; a ‘1’ indicates that the type of regulation is enforced at the state-
level; and a ‘2’ indicates that the regulation is more stringent at the state level than the associated federal 
standard. 
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AR 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 13 
CO 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 13 
GA 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 
IL 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 14 
IN 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 13 
IA 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 13 
KS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 13 
KY 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 13 
MI 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 
MN 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
MO 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 12 
NE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 12 
NC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 14 
OH 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 12 
OK 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 13 
PA 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 
SD 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 12 
TN 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 
TX 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 13 
UT 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 
VA 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 
WI 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 12 
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